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The Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), which is second only to the Internet in 
size, was supposed to be a mechanism to transform and support the Navy and Marine 
Corps with an IT infrastructure that would move the Department of Navy into the 21st 
century of warfare. Its function was to enhance command and control initiatives of the 
Navy and Marine Corps by harnessing the power of an integrated network. The current 
state of NMCI, though marred by a decade filled with marginal successes and many 
setbacks, is very positive, boasting more than 700,000 users, and consisting of over 
380,000 work stations in more than 3,000 locations dispersed over seven continents. In 
2008, Department of Navy leadership decided to move on and embrace the Next 
Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) guided by early transition activities (ETA) and 
continuity of services contract. The use of the ETAs was to successfully mitigate the risk 
while migrating services from a contractor-owned, contractor-operated model to one that 
gives the government increased command and control. The purpose of this research is to 
examine the effectiveness of ETA and concurrent contracts in mitigating the challenges 
of migrating from the NMCI environment. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  THESIS SUMMARY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....................................1 
A.  INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 
B.  CHAPTER SUMMARIES ..............................................................................2 
1.  Chapter II: History of NMCI ..............................................................2 
2.  Chapter III: Early Transition Activities and Contracts ..................4 
3.  Chapter IV: NGEN and NMCI the Common Ground .....................5 
C.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...................................................................6 
D.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................7 
II.  HISTORY OF NMCI ........................................................................................................9 
A.  THE ENDING: LOSING AND LETTING GO ............................................9 
1.  The Ending: The Genesis of NMCI ....................................................9 
2.  Losing: The Initial Struggle ..............................................................12 
a.  Congress ..................................................................................13 
b.  Echelon II Commanders .........................................................15 
3.  Letting Go ...........................................................................................16 
4.  Leaving a Legacy................................................................................17 
B.  THE NEUTRAL ZONE ................................................................................20 
1.  Survival ...............................................................................................20 
2.  NMCI Turns the Corner ...................................................................22 
C.  THE NEW BEGINNING ..............................................................................24 
1.  Current State of NMCI .....................................................................24 
2.  Acquisition of NGEN .........................................................................26 
a.  NGEN RFP Delayed ...............................................................27 
b.  Early Transition Activities ......................................................28 
D.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................28 
III. EARLY TRANSITION ACTIVITIES AND CONTRACTS ......................................29 
A.  EARLY TRANSITION ACTIVITIES .........................................................29 
1.  ETA 1A: Information Technology Service Management 
(ITSM) Process Development ...........................................................32 
2.  ETA 4: Comprehensive Facilities & Infrastructure Inventory .....33 
3.  ETA1B: Tools Strategy and Implementation/Integration .............34 
4.  ETA 1C: Global NetOps C2 Workforce Establishment .................35 
5.  ETA 9: Defense Information System Network Core Extension 
Phase 1.................................................................................................36 
6.  ETA 5: Contract Technical Representative (CTR) Workforce 
Reconstitution .....................................................................................37 
7.  USMC ETA 1: USMC Upgrade WAN & Implement Enterprise 
Services................................................................................................37 




1.  Contract for Transport Services.......................................................39 
2.  Contract for Enterprise Services ......................................................39 
3.  Contract for Enterprise Software Licenses .....................................40 
4.  Contract for End-User Hardware ....................................................40 
5.  Contract for Independent Security Operations Oversight and 
Assessment (ISOOA) .........................................................................41 
C.  GAO ASSESSMENT .....................................................................................42 
1.  Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) .........................................................43 
a.  Cost Estimation Weakness ......................................................44 
b.  Insufficient Assessment of Operational Effectiveness ..........45 
c.  Untimely Execution.................................................................49 
d.  Segmented Approach ..............................................................50 
D.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................50 
IV. NGEN AND NMCI: THE COMMON GROUND ........................................................51 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................51 
B.  FAILURES IN IMPLEMENTING IT .........................................................53 
















D.  ADDITIONAL RESEARCH TOPICS ........................................................85 
1.  Potential flaws of a Common Network ............................................85 
2.  Security ...............................................................................................86 
3.  Cost ......................................................................................................86 
E.  THESIS CONCLUSION ...............................................................................87 
APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................89 
A.  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO 
RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................89 
B.  NAVADMIN 337/08 – NEXT GENERATION ENTERPRISE 
NETWORK (NGEN) SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE (SPO) 
ESTABLISHMENT .......................................................................................90 
 ix
C.  NAVADMIN 270/10 – NEXT GENERATION ENTERPRISE 
NETWORK (NGEN) SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE (SPO) 
DISESTABLISHMENT ................................................................................91 
D.  NMCI CONTINUITY OF SERVICES CONTRACT (COSC) .................92 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................93 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Macro View of Transition Activities and Contracts for NGEN (From 
Holland, 2010) .................................................................................................30 
Figure 2.  NGEN Segmented Solution (From Holland, 2010) .........................................42 
Figure 3.  Acquisition Process with Milestones Overview (From DAU, n.d.) ................43 
Figure 4.  DON’s Qualitative Assessment of Alternatives’ Ability to Meet NGEN 
Capabilities and Goals (From GAO, 2010) .....................................................47 
Figure 5.  NGEN Major Milestone Delay (From GAO, 2012) ........................................48 
Figure 6.  Qualitative Classes of Stakeholders (After Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). ..54 
Figure 7.  Project Management Cycle (From Gutierrez & Friedman, 2005). ..................59 
Figure 8.  CPIC Process (From NIST, 2009, p.9) ............................................................68 
Figure 9.  A Typical View of Command and Control—Command and Control Seen 
as Unidirectional (After MCDP 6, 1996) .........................................................80 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Early Transition Activities (After GAO, 2010) ...............................................31 
Table 2.  NGEN Program Critical Risks, as of July 2012 (After GAO 2012a) ..............65 
Table 3.  Summary of Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Title 40 from National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (After Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996). ..........67 
Table 4.  Estimated Frequency of Reasons for the Most Recent Rebaselining of 
Projects Category of Reasons (After GAO 2008b) ..........................................71 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
BAN Base Area Network  
C2  
CAPE 
Command and Control 
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation  
CCA 
CDD 
Clinger-Cohen Act  
Capability Development Document  
CDR 
CI 




Chief Information Officer  
Concept of Operations 




Chief of Naval Operations 
CPD 
CPIC 
Capability Production Document 
Capital Planning and Investment Control 





Defense Acquisition System  
Defense Contract Audit Agency 
Defense Information Systems Agency 
Defense Information System Network 
DoD 
DoDD 
Department of Defense  
Department of Defense Directive 
DON 
EDS 
Department of the Navy  




Enterprise License Agreements 
Early Transition Activities 
Federal Acquisition Regulations 




Full Operational Capability  
Government Accountability Office 
GFE 
GIG 
Government Furnished Equipment 
Global Information Grid 




Government-Owned Government-Operated  
Hewlett-Packard 
Information Assurance 




Initial Operational Capability 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Integrated Product Team 





Information Technology  
Information Technology Asset Management 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
Information Technology Service Management 
LAN Local Area Network 
LPTA Lowest Price Technically Acceptable  
MAGTF  Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
MAIS 
MCEN  
Major Automated Information System 
Marine Corps Enterprise Network 
MCHS Marine Corps Common Hardware Suite 
MCNOSC Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Command 
MD Management Domains  
MDD Materiel Development Decision 
MITSC 
MOE 
MAGTF Information Technology Support Center  
Measurements of Effectiveness 
MSA  Materiel Solution Analysis 






Navy Marine Corps Intranet  
Network Operation Centers 
Office of Management and Budget 
Operational Evaluation 




Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation 




Request for Proposal 




System Design Specification  
Service-Level Agreement 
Service Oriented Architecture 
SPO  System Program Office  
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threat  




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I thank God for his grace that was sufficient for me; I am nothing apart from him. 
To my angel, Ruby, and my boys, Alexander and Christopher: You are the reason 
I keep pressing on. Thank you for all the love, patience, support and prayers. 
To Dr. Barrett: Thank you for your patience, advice and friendship, and most of 
all, for saying “yes to the mess.” 
To Chris G, Marvin, and Chris B: These two years have been awesome because of 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
    1
I. THESIS SUMMARY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the thesis topic, provides a brief overview of each chapter, 
and presents the thesis research methodology. This thesis seeks to assess Department of 
the Navy’s implementation strategy by comparing the implementation of the Navy 
Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) and the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN). 
Second only to the Internet in size, NMCI was supposed to be a mechanism to support to 
the Navy and Marine Corps with an information technology (IT) infrastructure that would 
move the Department of the Navy (DON) into the 21st century of warfare. Its function is 
to enhance command and control initiatives of the Navy and Marine Corps by harnessing 
the power of an integrated network. The current state of NMCI is very positive despite its 
calamitous beginnings, as it boasts over 700,000 users and comprises over 380,000 work 
stations in more than 3,000 locations dispersed over seven continents. This robust 
network annually facilitates the transfer of over 3.5 terabytes of data, while denying in 
excess of two million unauthorized access attempts (DoD, 2009). The entire intranet is 
designed to have fail-safe security by operations stemming from four decentralized 
network-operating hubs. Amidst speculations of the need for change, the DON has 
decided to move to the Next Generation Enterprise Network. Reasons for change include 
a need for the government to have more control over the network, better information 
assurance, and an improved defense posture against looming cyber threats. This thesis 
will show how the Navy’s leaders are not leveraging the lessons learned from the 
implementation of NMCI and will therefore make the same mistakes. 
Chapter II gives an overview of the DON network enterprise starting with a brief 
history of NMCI, its current state, and its future state as NGEN. The third chapter 
provides a detailed analysis of the early transition activities (ETA), focusing on the 
effectiveness of the ETAs as they facilitate the transition from NMCI to NGEN, and their 
ability to provide the desired future state. The fourth chapter focuses on the common 
factors that lead to failures in implementing IT using the “Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats” (SWOT) model.  The chapter will also provide in-depth 
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stakeholder analyses before, during, and after the change, and recommend a robust 
change plan that will leverage existing ETAs and industry best practices in enhancing the 
transition process. The final chapter summarizes the work and provides recommendations 
for further work.  
In addition to recommendations for enhancing the transition process of large and 
complex IT initiatives in the DoD, this thesis raises many questions for future research, 
such as how can the government operate NGEN with a combination of low price and 
high performance with a segmented network run by multiple contractors? With too many 
stakeholder relationships, can the government leverage the nine best practices associated 
with developing and maintaining a reliable schedule in the ongoing change process with 
NGEN? And, how can leaders, especially in large and complex organizations, resist or 
refuse to acknowledge realignment feedback that could help the process? Though this 
thesis does not overtly provide the answers to these questions, it offers opportunities for 
consideration that can help in the averting more costly implementations in the future. 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARIES  
1. Chapter II: History of NMCI  
The “need” for the Department of Defense (DoD) to attain information superiority 
was led DoD and DON leadership to create a system that had the capability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or 
denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. These leaders felt the daily functions of 
DoD was becoming more reliant on information technology it was time to let go of the 
current way of doing business. The problem would turn out to be not a system, but a 
prevalence of systems, disparate networks that handled several complex operations but 
were incapable of communicating with other systems. 
The DON Chief Information Officer (CIO), established by the 1996 Clinger-
Cohen Act, would be ill-equipped to deal with the vast number of unique IT systems, and 
in 1998 decided to establish a common network. The common network would be known 
as the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet and it would face incessant impediments, none of 
which would be more intense than that of the United States Congress. Congress’s source 
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of contention was DON’s attempt to bypass the usual process of issuing its request for 
proposals, a formal analysis of alternative program options and a business case analysis. 
Congress would eventually assume control of the NMCI procurement process and further 
choke the growth of the budding intranet.  
Echelon II commanders also expressed resistance to the common network idea as 
the reality of it loomed closer. A variance in IT funding was a stumbling block for some 
Echelon II commanders especially those commands that had access to more funds than 
others. These opulent commands resisted the notion of parity and eventually received the 
attention of the civilian leadership and an order of forced compliance. 
Electronic Data Systems (EDS) eventually won the contract. The next step 
was the daunting task of consolidating over 200 different computer networks and linking 
over 400,000 desktop computers that were dispersed throughout Navy and Marine Corps 
commands. The environment and the task were particularly disconcerting to EDS because 
each command encompassed thousands of personalized storehouses with a variety of 
customized hardware and software that was incompatible with NMCI’s security 
protocols. 
The unsettling environment impeded overall implementation and increased over 
time, causing catastrophic financial losses for EDS. As of mid-2000, the Navy still had 
over 1,000 legacy networks or devices that were running about 11,000 applications. This 
unexpected number of legacy systems led to schedule delays and cost overruns. After 
many years of contending with and trying to appease Congress, EDS and the end-user, 
DON, saw NMCI revitalize. 
As NMCI continued to gain traction, the pressure from Congress started to wane, 
and with the change of Congress’s leadership and amidst incessant negativity, DON 
again contemplated the standards and requirements for an information technology 
network to succeed the multibillion-dollar NMCI after the contract expired. DON now 
saw the prudence in diligently researching, clarifying, and aligning the relationships 
between IT requirements and the acquisition community so as to best be able to respond 
efficiently to direction from higher authorities. The progeny of the alignment of IT 
requirements and the acquisition community would be a successor of NMCI, the Next 
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Generation Enterprise Network. DON planned an incremental implementation of NGEN 
to avoid disrupting service to any exiting capabilities, and it had to be in place before the 
NMCI contract ended. Like NMCI, the procurement of NGEN would be novel as DON 
developed an acquisition strategy that allowed for several options and combinations of 
contracts that could easily be adjusted to meet current and future environments.  
2. Chapter III: Early Transition Activities and Contracts 
This chapter highlights the ETA and follow-on contracts to give an in-depth 
description of what they are and their intended purpose. This chapter also evaluates the 
effectiveness of the ETA and the overall transition from the NMCI environment to the 
NGEN environment.  
In 2009, DON officials, leveraging lessons learned from the NMCI transition, 
began to develop ETAs to prepare for a successful migration of services from a 
contractor-owned contractor-operated model to one that gives the government increased 
command and control. With the ETAs, DON officials plan to mitigate the risk of 
migration to the NGEN segmentation service model for both industry and the 
government. 
Each segment represents an allocation of IT services, functions, tools, and roles 
and responsibilities associated with end-to-end service delivery that will be provided by 
contractors or government sources fielded through multiple competitive awards. DON 
officials understand the segmentation of the network will create seams that must be 
managed effectively to ensure successful delivery and continuity of services. The two 
primary segments to be awarded are enterprise services and transport services and the 
remaining three segments are end user hardware; enterprise software licenses; and 
independent security operations, oversight and assessment support. 
In response to DON’s ETA process, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) was directed by Congress to ensure that the DON had sufficiently analyzed 
alternative acquisition approaches and demonstrated that a reliable schedule and 
executable program was being used. GAO officials showed that the overall NGEN 
acquisition approach was not grounded in a reliable analysis of alternatives approach and 
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had a poorly derived integrated master schedule which was responsible for the delays of 
key program documentation and gate review decisions. 
DoD, DON and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials refuted the 
findings in favor of prior decisions to keep the NGEN rollout on pace in spite of the 
apparent shortfalls and risks. These risks had been identified in the past and had 
materialized into critical issues that stagnated the transition efforts and added several 
billions to the estimated cost at completion.  
3. Chapter IV: NGEN and NMCI the Common Ground  
The last chapter of this thesis discusses the reasons that led to failures in 
implementing IT by comparing the implementation process of NMCI and NGEN, and 
evaluating and addressing key weaknesses in the areas of stakeholder expectation, 
requirements development, and program management. Chapter IV was built using a 
variation of the SWOT model to show the many similarities between NMCI and NGEN 
implementation. The chapter highlights the erroneous strategies still being used for 
NGEN that were also used for NMCI, and recommends opportunities to ameliorate 
current deficiencies.  
Of the many reasons that lead to failures in implementing IT, many experts agree 
that poor management, failure to meet stakeholders’ expectations, and poor requirements 
development are amongst the top (Global IT project management survey, 2005). Other 
failure causes include technology and technical issues, unpredictable external factors, and 
politically motivated requests embedded in the project; these obstacles make it difficult to 
manage and meet objectives. This chapter recommends holistic management practices 
that take into account the various stakeholders and the change process, and leverage key 
interdependencies. The intent is the application of a more robust model that aligns 
resources and activities, and provides means to identify critical paths, consequently 
providing a testable model applicable to all phases of IT change within the Department of 
Defense. 
A disparity of expectations causes a challenge for the different stakeholder 
groups. The challenge is a result of the required negotiation and appeasement of all 
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stakeholders with the intent of achieving a common ground to pursue the project goals 
and maintain the project management effort. The solution to the disparity in expectations 
is a shared vision because it ensures a buy-in to the idea for all parties concerned, and this 
vision (the desired state) comes alive only when it is shared. A dynamic relationship, 
rather than the unidirectional, command and control norm that is seen in the 
implementation of NGEN and NMCI, is the key to motivate people to coalesce and 
realize a desired vision.  
In addition to a shared vision, there must be a meticulous requirements definition 
process that stems from a shared vision. If the requirements are not clearly stated up 
front, complexity is adversely affected and can exponentially increase the scope, cost, 
and time of the overall project. The solution to the problem of wasted funds on IT 
projects that have failed to deliver promised functionality is to build systems using an 
agile or modular development process (i.e., by breaking projects into more manageable 
chunks and demanding new functionality every few quarters). 
Finally, failures in IT acquisition can be attributed to the high rate of personnel 
turnover in government acquisition and also a general lack of skilled personnel. The 
transient nature of DoD personnel is due to the frequent permanent changes of station 
(PCS) and the lack of skilled personnel can be attributed to the long-held misconception 
that IT detracts from war fighting. Though these issues pervade all areas of DoD, the 
solution offered is the active recruitment and retention of a competent cadre of program 
managers. Competent management is essential for each project because of the vast 
number of interdependent elements that vary and have to be identified and analyzed, a 
task that is not easily achieved even in the simplest of projects. These interdependencies 
can cause overt or covert disruptions that if not checked can cause major projects to fail.  
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The research strategy for this thesis started with parsing significant facts from 
NMCI’s historical timeline to develop Chapter II and provide context for the comparison 
in subsequent chapters. The next step was to evaluate the NGEN requirements documents 
to fully capture current activities of the implementation process. This work was done 
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concurrently with the review of technical manuals and other academic writings regarding 
change management and leadership, in order to compare the implementation processes of 
NMCI and NGEN. 
The sources of data that contributed to the development of this thesis were mostly 
archival data, including news releases, Navy messages, NGEN program documents, GAO 
reports, and various publications and Internet websites. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the reader to this thesis’s research 
topic, provide a broad overview of each chapter contained within this thesis, and provide 
the research methodology used to gather data. The next chapter will outline the entire 
history of NMCI beginning with the conception of a naval intranet and will end with the 
current state of NMCI as it transitions to NGEN. The history chapter provides a 
chronological account of NMCI to provide context and background information 
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II. HISTORY OF NMCI 
Never before has it been more imperative for organizations to remain relevant to 
their stakeholders if they wish to survive, than in recent years. Organizations must not 
only execute core missions at a high level, they must always remain attuned to the 
internal (employee dissatisfaction, process incompatibility, etc.) and external (policy, 
economic trends and technological advances) needs for change (Anderson & Anderson, 
2001). These requirements are true for any organization and more so for large and 
complex organizations where the difficulties of managing any transformation are greatly 
increased. Bridges (2009) identified the three phases of any transformation or transition 
as (1) the ending: letting go of the old ways and identity, (2) the neutral zone: when the 
old is gone and the new is not fully operational, and (3) the new beginning: when people 
develop the new identity, experience the new energy, and discover the new sense of 
purpose that make the change begin to work.  
A. THE ENDING: LOSING AND LETTING GO  
1. The Ending: The Genesis of NMCI  
In the DoD, the need for change is often framed as a development process rooted 
in the articulation of higher-level policies, strategies, mission and objectives. The process 
starts with the generation of policy, which fuels strategies and missions, and during these 
missions military leadership makes various assessments. The focal point of the 
assessments is to evaluate and reveal performance and capability gaps between the status 
quo and a desired future state.  
These needs are then vetted for legitimacy and approved if found deserving. The 
incumbent chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili expressed the 
“need” for DoD to attain information superiority in Joint Chiefs of Staff-issued Joint 
Vision 2010 (1997). He conveyed the urgency of establishing a system that had the 
capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while 
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same; it was time to let go of the 
current way of doing business when it came to information technology.  
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The problem would turn out to be not a system, but an abundance of systems. At 




 commands had an in-house IT support staff 
that provided autonomous budgeting and management of customized IT systems. The 
entire DoD “enterprise” was made up of a vast number of disparate networks that handled 
several complex operations but were incapable of communicating with other systems. In 
GAO report (1998a), the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, 
Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD (C3I)) identified the enormous 
complexity and consequent failures that the disparate systems could pose. ASD (C3I) 
believed that the disparate nature of the networks had undermined all DoD’s attempts at 
management and this difficulty continued to increase due to the proliferation of more 
unprotected and disparate networks. These networks had multiple gateways with virtually 
unhindered access for malicious intruders and, because of the decentralized nature of the 
networks, it was impossible to accurately assess the operational readiness of the 
networks’ information systems and identify their information assurance requirements. 
The autonomous and complex systems continued to pervade in the DoD in spite 
of the Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA), which was enacted in 1996 to reform acquisition laws 
and revamp the ailing management of information technology in the federal government. 
CCA (1996) established a CIO for each federal agency, an action that consequently led to 
the formation of the Chief Information Officers Council. The CIO was responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of IT standards (consistent with federal information 
technology architectures) to include common standards for interconnectivity and 
interoperability, categorization of government electronic information, and computer 
system efficiency and security. The CIO office promulgated the guidelines for its 
agencies’ IT systems, but did not have much oversight concerning budget or the ability to 
enforce standards.  
The DON CIO established by the CCA was ill equipped to deal with all of the 
Navy’s 29 Echelon II commands, all of which exercised virtual autonomy in acquiring 
                                                 
1 The Naval entities that report directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, including the Naval Air 
Systems Command, Office of Navy Intelligence, and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. Major 
Commands include entities that report directly to the Marine Corps, including Marine Forces Atlantic, 
Marine Forces Pacific and Marine Forces Reserve. 
2 Subordinate command to an Echelon II command  
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and managing their IT systems. Discretion on the purchase of IT-related components was 
done under the purview of what the command leaders deemed necessary and how much 
money was available at the end of each month. IT systems grew and morphed based on 
the “DNA” of their organic command; each network was an extension of the command 
culture. As these disparate systems continued to thrive, the lack of interoperability as well 
as deficiencies in network security became more apparent. The lack of standardization 
was no more apparent than when there was an influx of new personnel to a command. In 
the DON, frequent changes in duty stations and assignments are the norm, so personnel 
were often faced with unfamiliar operating systems, and associated software such as 
email e-mail. The transient nature of personnel impacted productivity throughout the 
Navy because of the lack of standardization of applications. The diversity and uniqueness 
of these systems further impeded the efforts of Navy and DoD officials to obtain 
visibility on how much was being spent and how to improve management and security. 
With enumerable unprotected gateways, intruders had many opportunities to exploit 
Navy networks and, in 2001, the number of intrusions experienced was estimated at over 
16,000 (Munns, 2003).  
In an effort to address the myriad of concerns with the networks within the DON, 
in 1998, the leadership of the Navy and the Marine Corps decided to establish single 
networks within the services. The Navy would develop the Navy Wide Intranet and the 
Marines, the Marine Corps Enterprise Network. Plagued with many disparate IT systems 
and many with duplicated efforts, the secretary of the Navy directed the seemingly 
incapable DON CIO to synergize the Navy and Marine efforts and to establish a common 
network that addressed the lack of interoperability.  
Despite the apparent advantages in the notion of a secure and interoperable 
common network, the impetus for the network was overwhelmingly financial, and in 
March 1999, the assistant secretary of the Navy, research, development & acquisition 
further directed the combined efforts to be bought as a service (Taylor, 2006). The 
assistant secretary’s intent was to leverage the expertise and investment of the civilian 
industry rather than having the DON reinvest in the same areas. The DON decided that 
the requirements of the new common network could be procured efficiently through a 
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single private-sector entity providing end-to-end IT capabilities as a service under a long-
term commercial-type “seat management” contract. Navy officials initiated the 
performance-based contract for NMCI, in June 1999 with six months of market research 
(Jordan & Johnson, 2007). On December 23, 1999, the Navy released a request for 
proposals (RFP) for the intranet with the expectation of awarding a firm, fixed-price 
contract with performance incentives (GAO, 2000).  
Typically a premier document issued early in the procurement of systems, the 
RFP is used to accurately define the current state of the system that requires altering or 
replacing. With this level of detail, a supplier is able to offer solutions that could address 
the requirement; the overarching intent is the minimization of abstraction during the 
procurement process. However, the RFP drafted by the Navy leadership had a high level 
of abstraction and did not provide potential bidders with an accurate picture of the 
existing infrastructure. Most commands could not produce the total number of computers 
or applications, or give an intelligible assessment of the budgets and security posture of 
their networks when requested by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
(Perkins, 2005). The RFP was released late in 1999, and as the Navy leadership awaited 
responses from the commercial sector, they instructed all commanding officers and 
component commanders to ensure any and all existing IT contracts would expire within 
the year. All commands had to participate in the nascent network and all efforts to 
expedite a future transition to NMCI were necessary (Taylor, 2006).  
2. Losing: The Initial Struggle  
Opposition to change can vary with the degree of change implemented and the 
expectation of the process. Bridges (2009) believes that in the process of transition, 
resistance is in response more to what has to be “let go” than to “what” is changing, and 
can take the form of foot-dragging or sabotage (p. 16). The Navy leadership began to face 
myriads of opposition, all culminating in a massive resistance to the idea of the intranet. 
The resistance to NMCI was both internal and external to the DON, but none was more 
intense than that of the United States Congress. The resistance from the legislative branch 
all stemmed from the decision of Navy leadership to deviate from the established process 
of “rubbing shoulders” and pacification of necessary “gatekeepers” in the procurement of 
    13
NMCI. Navy leadership bypassed the usual process of issuing the request for proposals to 
and a formal analysis of alternative (AoA) program options and a business case analysis. 
DON also lacked a definitive plan on how a project will be funded and all risk mitigation 
efforts intended to address significant risks associated with such large undertakings. Navy 
officials argued that since NMCI was being procured as service, Regulation 5000.2-R did 
not apply to the intranet effort. The regulation defines a Major Automated Information 
System as an automated information system acquisition program that requires total 
lifecycle costs in excess of $360 million in fiscal year 1996 constant dollars (GAO, 
2000).  
a. Congress 
The procurement of NMCI using the utility model for buying IT capability 
on a per seat basis was a new concept that appeared to circumvent congressional 
committees’ usual oversight power for reviewing, authorizing and appropriating funds for 
acquisition programs (Perkins, 2005). Navy leaders knew that the cost of NMCI would be 
several billion dollars, but they were confident that the intranet, when finished, would be 
a less costly IT infrastructure and that it would enable substantial future savings. Navy 
officials had hoped that the financing of NMCI could be handled by reprogramming and 
transferring funding that was already designated for IT services, thereby bypassing a 
lengthy congressional process, which would invite scrutiny from Congress on a micro 
level, with its members requesting a delay in the acquisition and implementation of the 
intranet until it was fully developed. Congress demanded to be included in the future 
budget request and given the proper level of congressional oversight (Taylor, 2006). 
Congress challenged the idea of using funds already allocated to IT 
systems to fund the new intranet because there was no plan in place to address how the 
Navy intended to support the current legacy systems while trying to develop and 
implement a replacement. Additionally, the Navy had failed repeatedly to provide 
concrete financial accounts for current IT systems and expected savings that would 
justify the project.  
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Congress was also concerned with the circumvention of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular Number A-76. Circular A-76 outlined a 
mandatory process of cost benefit analysis of new outsourcing initiatives, and with 
NMCI, Navy leadership in essence would “alter” functions currently done by government 
employees without doing due diligence by comparing the outsourced cost with the lowest 
possible internal cost. As it stood, there was a potential and negative impact of NMCI 
implementation on employees of current naval networking and telecommunications 
systems. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) was one of the organizations 
and was leading the opposition via Congress. DISA was responsible for providing and 
ensuring long distance communications to the armed forces. It argued that hundreds of 
jobs would be lost to the NMCI initiative and the imminent withdrawal of the Navy and 
the Marine Corps (which already has its own service-wide network) from the system 
would burden the Army and Air Force with excessive costs. The pace at which the Navy 
planned to build the intranet further raised doubt with Congress as to the Navy’s ability to 
properly structure and manage the huge NMCI contract. All the negatives associated with 
the innovative acquisition of the intranet would culminate in the idea of subversion from 
Navy leadership and the compulsion of Congress to take an aggressive stance. 
Congress eventually took control of the NMCI procurement process and 
further choked the growth of the budding intranet. Congress insisted on the revision of 
the RFP to require that all bidders make provision to hire any displaced federal 
employees, and to create a small business set-aside program
3
 for at least 35% of the work 
to go to small business subcontractors who otherwise might be elbowed aside by the giant 
umbrella contract (GAO, 2000). One of the additional requirements from Congress to the 
Navy leadership regarding NMCI was a mandate that the system go through an 
operational evaluation (OPEVAL). Though this requirement was a staple for most major 
systems acquisitions, it would prove to be a daunting task for the Navy. A typical 
OPEVAL is done on systems to verify that a proposed system meets all predefined 
                                                 
3 Federal Government Goaling Program ensures that not less than 23% of all government contracts go 
to small businesses, not less than 5% to woman-owned small businesses, small disadvantaged businesses, 
and not less than 3% to service disabled veteran-owned small businesses and certified HUBZone small 
businesses. 
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operational requirements. The issue with the OPEVAL was that there had not been a 
system like the NMCI before, so all the operational requirements had to be drafted and 
defined for the first time. The OPEVAL process will continue for the next couple of years 
with an accretion in both requirements and complexity. 
b. Echelon II Commanders 
As early as 1997, Echelon II commanders had been involved in the 
inception of a central enterprise network and after two years of numerous and intense 
deliberations had reluctantly coalesced on the notion of a shared vision for an enterprise 
IT system (Perkins, 2005). This notional alliance would prove precarious as the reality of 
the network drew closer. As the RFP was being drafted, the office of the CNO tried to 
create an accurate picture of the state of the current disparate networks but was met with 
passive resistance. The Echelon II commands insisted that any data collected had to 
conceal the true amount that was being spent on IT. Perkins (2005) noted that commands 
went as far as refusal of automated methods to gather the information and this was met 
with little or no interference from the Echelon II commanders. The numbers produced 
from the lackluster inventory of the legacy applications would produce 22 thousand 
applications, which would prove to be only one-fifth of the total.  
Some Echelon II commands had access to more funds than others. These 
commands had spent and continued to spend a significant amount of money on IT, 
buying the latest and the best that technology had to offer. At the other end of the 
spectrum were commands that bought IT services sparingly and had systems that 
consisted of antiquated servers and computers. The commands with IT opulence were 
most resistant to reporting accurate number of systems in their commands; an accurate 
report of all IT systems that included current financial expenditures would, in effect, 
decrease the overall funding to those commands if all funding used on current IT systems 
was diverted to fund NMCI. Though the new intranet would increase security and 
interoperability, it would also assure a level of parity in IT across the board and this 
meant that the days of unrestrained and lavish spending on IT would be gone. The 
stalling efforts of the commands would finally receive the attention of then secretary of 
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the Navy, Honorable Richard Danzig. Feeling that he had given due diligence by 
listening to all concerns and tired of the passive objections from the commands, he 
ordered Charles Nemfakos, United States assistant secretary of the Navy (financial 
management and comptroller) to recapture all visible IT funding in the Echelon II 
budgets and redirect it to NMCI (Perkins, 2005).  
The struggle internally from the commanders and externally from 
Congress would continue to plague the Navy leadership as they were confronted with an 
incessant balancing act of extracting data from reluctant commands and warding off the 
ever-growing restrictions from Congress.  
3. Letting Go  
With all transitions, there has to be some form of letting go of the old reality and 
the old identity of the status quo before change takes place (Bridges, 2009). Letting go 
for some stakeholders might be harder than for others, but this resistance has to be 
addressed for a successful transition. 
The resistance continued and intensified, but NMCI survived its tumultuous 
beginnings, and, in October of 2000, a contract for the intranet in the amount of $6.9 
billion was awarded to Electronic Data Systems Corp. EDS was selected to create a 
digital information network linking ships, bases, and service members around the globe. 
The nearly $7 billion contract would be meted out in increments with a five-year contract 
worth at least $4.1 billion and a three-year option worth at least $2.8 billion. The contract 
did not include a defined schedule for implementation because the Navy leadership 
believed the contract was based on compensation arrangements and payments tied to an 
“iron clad” service-level agreement (SLA) and user satisfaction. The leadership felt that 
the contract as drafted provided sufficient motivation for EDS to move as quickly as 
possible (Schneider, 2000). 
EDS had earned the daunting task of consolidating over 200 separate computer 
networks and linking some 350,000 desktop computers dispersed throughout Navy and 
Marine Corps commands. With the largest federal IT contract ever competitively 
awarded, EDS, the main contractor, created a multidisciplinary team of companies known 
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as the information strike force (ISF) to handle the overall project. The team included 
Raytheon (security), WorldCom (network connectivity) and General Dynamics (network 
consulting), as well as 200 subcontractors assembled to develop the new system that 
would be capable of putting huge resources at the fingertips of sailors and marines in the 
field. Some of the capabilities touted were the ability to conduct seamless and real-time 
troubleshooting between operational forces and appropriate resources; the myriad of 
possible issues that could arise could now be solved via face-to-face video conferencing 
or the accessing of databases from mobile devices at remote locations.  
4. Leaving a Legacy 
After the contract was signed, EDS and the Navy leadership were ready to begin 
the actual intranet implementation process. Congress wanted the process to be 
incremental and mandated that the initial rollout would be only 40,000 seats. After a 
successful test and evaluation period, DoD then could authorize installation of an 
additional 100,000 seats. The process for a site rollout involved EDS assuming 
acceptance of responsibility for a site and taking over the operation of the legacy network 
until the cutover to the NMCI environment. The environment that EDS came to face not 
only derailed the plan and schedule of the implementation, but also almost destroyed the 
entire process. 
The environment was highly disconcerting to EDS because not only did it have to 
wait for DISA approval,
4
 but each command was littered with thousands of computers 
(personal storehouses of everything from preferred screensavers and downloaded music 
to customized software) with applications that could not be installed on NMCI because 
they could not run on Windows 2000 or did not meet security protocols (Perkins, 2005). 
The end users in general appeared to be ill informed about what it would take to be part 
of the NMCI enterprise. This ignorance of the end user caused either apathy or blatant 
resistance. The apathy first manifested in benign but overt forms of frustration with the 
rigidity of the security levels or the complexity of the systems. The more adept user, 
                                                 
4 The August 17, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) required that DISA have the first 
opportunity to satisfy all wide area network (WAN) requirements and only in instances where DISA is not 
able to meet the service requirements. Commercial augmentation, i.e., EDS, would be allowed. 
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described as an end user with maximum control of a legacy system, would experience an 
unpleasant reality: the transition from a carte blanche localized control to a high degree of 
centralized control and operation. This more adept user exhibited an extreme form of 
resistance. In these extreme cases, actions often culminated in deliberate attempts to 
antagonize EDS’s efforts during local installation. The ISF was required to determine the 
nature of all the legacy systems and vet the potential to migrate to the network, or scrap 
and replace. The process proved to be unusually arduous due to resistance from personnel 
and also because of the DoD information technology security certification and 
accreditation process.
5
 As the certification process continued, the number of applications 
found at Navy commands continued to increase and the final number was estimated to 
exceed 100,000, with 30% of the number not being used (Perkins, 2005). 
The difficulty of this environment was further compounded by the delays in 
constructing Network Operation Centers (NOC), which would serve as hubs of the new 
network. NOCs had to be built and put into operation before the process of cutover could 
be accomplished. Six had been planned initially, but the Navy leadership would settle on 
four based on recommendation from EDS (Taylor, 2006). NOCs were designed to 
provide around-the-clock network management and monitoring, user administration, and 
information security services to all seats on the NMCI network. The delay in construction 
of the NOCs added to the delays; however, the gross underestimation of the number of 
legacy systems proved to be the single point of impedance to the implementation efforts, 
and this setback sent ripples that soon were felt outside the confines of the Echelon II 
commands (Perkins, 2005). 
One of the significant setbacks observed during the implementation at Quantico, 
VA, was that after the first 90 days of implementation, only 568 seats had been delivered, 
although the expectation had been the delivery of 30 seats a day (Jordan & Johnson, 
2007). Lt. Gen. Edward Hanlon, then commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, attributed the issues of implementation to an unprepared and 
under-resourced EDS team. The fact was that EDS had underbid significantly to win the 
                                                 
5 The information technology security certification and accreditation process defines a process that 
standardizes all activities leading to a successful accreditation with the intent of minimizing the risks 
associated with nonstandard security implementations across shared defense information infrastructure and 
end systems. 
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contract and had invested nearly $2 billion of its funds into the system and was 
hemorrhaging millions of dollars; EDS recorded a loss of $316 million during the first six 
months of implementation (Jordan & Johnson, 2007). The increasing stagnation in 
overall implementation was directly proportional to the losses EDS would continue to 
endure. EDS’s huge financial losses were partly due to inaccurate reporting, and in some 
cases no reporting, of the real impact of legacy systems, some of the systems being used 
for vital operations that could not be dispensed with. These legacy systems almost 
crippled the initial effort as more time than was allocated for the set-up of the 
infrastructure was used to either merge or migrate the legacy systems onto the NMCI 
infrastructure. Under the contract, EDS was guaranteed a minimum order per year and 
was only paid when a seat became operational. At that point, EDS was to be paid 85% of 
the contract seat price. After satisfactory execution of appropriate SLAs, then EDS could 
charge 100% of the seat price. Incentive payments were also contingent on end users’ 
satisfaction as determined through on-line surveys conducted quarterly by an outside 
firm. At 85% satisfaction, EDS was scheduled to receive an additional $25 per seat; at 
90%, $50; and at 95%, EDS would earn an additional $100 per seat (Perkins, 2005). The 
setbacks continued, and in the early stages of the network implementation, EDS posted a 
pre-tax loss of nearly $1 billion. 
Congress interpreted the setbacks with NMCI as a failure of Navy leadership to 
appropriately curb the issues with the implementation. The response to this inefficiency 
was to release the Marine Corps from the program, excluding aviation depots and naval 
shipyards, and further reduce the amount requested by the president by $160 million 
(Taylor, 2006). Congress did not approve of the pace, testing methods, and the general 
handling of funding for NMCI. The leadership of the Navy, including the leadership from 
the Marine Corps, was very vocal about their opposition to the recommendations from 
Congress. They argued that the Marines were awaiting much needed refreshment that 
would be accomplished through the NMCI implementation. The accusatory tone from 
Congress countered by the vehement defense of the network and statements concerning 
funding from Navy leadership continued for months to come. The sentiment from Wall 
Street pundits was that EDS’s cash flow problems were caused by the government’s 
refusal to pay for EDS’s NMCI work. In 2002, after much angst among the stakeholders, 
Congress extended the NMCI contract and mandated the Secretary of the Navy to name a 
single person “whose sole responsibility will be to direct and oversee the NMCI 
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program” (Plummer, 2001). The Navy named Rear Admiral Charles “Chuck” Munns, a 
career submariner, to head the NMCI directors’ office and a Marine Corps colonel, 
Robert Logan, as his deputy. The extension until 2010 brought the value of the contract 
to $8.82 billion (Onley, 2002). 
B. THE NEUTRAL ZONE  
1. Survival 
The neutral zone, as described by Bridges (2009), is a period in the transition 
process when neither the old ways nor the new ways work satisfactorily. This was an 
appropriate description for NMCI as the number of applications that could not be 
installed continued to grow.  
As of January 2006, there was a 40% pass rate on the applications that 
have been re-tested for use on Windows XP. As extreme examples, the 
Naval Flight Planning System application (a popular flight planning 
program that allows pilots to calculate fuel consumption, print flight 
routes, and view satellite images of practice targets) and the Super Hornet 
squadrons’ SAME maintenance application simply did not work on NMCI 
machines running the Windows XP operating system. Because of these 
and other incompatibility problems, NAS Lemoore has elected to stay 
with Windows 2000. (Taylor, 2006, p. 69) 
NMCI continued to grow, albeit at a slower rate than expected, but with its slow 
accretion came a significant rise in overall DoD spending. This combination of slow 
implementation and a high price tag made NMCI a good candidate to get cut from the 
budget each year. In 2003, the House Armed Services Committee recommended across-
the-board cuts of Pentagon information technology programs because of a lack of 
feedback on the programs’ progress, and NMCI was top on the list. According to GAO 
report (2006) the intended pace projected between 412,000 and 416,000 seats operational 
by fiscal year 2004, but by August of 2002, EDS had assumed responsibility for 
operating and maintaining only 57,674 seats, 19,536 of which had reached “cutover.” The 
project finally had the minimum numbers required by Congress to transition into the 
operational testing and evaluation assessments. The Navy was authorized to order an 
additional 150,000 seats, on top of the 160,000 that already had been authorized 
contingent upon successful testing and evaluation. Testing and evaluation of the network 
was marginally successful at some sites and a failure in others. For example, during 
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USMC Operational Analysis of the NMCI deployable solutions, the field operators could 
not access the NMCI help desk from deployed positions (DOT&E, 2003). Despite the 
results of the assessment, the Navy ordered the cutover of 150,000 seats, and the pace of 
deployment ramped up significantly; by mid-2003, 98,650 NMCI workstations had been 
brought online.  
In 2003, with borderline improvements with the network implementation, NMCI 
was tested by the prevalence of viruses and worms that plagued many commercial and 
government networks. A series of major virus attacks, to include Blaster, Nimbda, 
Iloveyou, SQE, Slammer and Sapphire, running from 2002 to 2004, brought down or 
slowed vulnerable networks, but NMCI had successfully blocked 267 million attempted 
intrusions and detected 2,033 new viruses (Perkins, 2005). In August of 2003, NMCI lost 
the battle and succumbed to Welchia worm, which crippled service to thousands of 
computer users. Though the attack only affected the unclassified portion of NMCI, it 
affected more than 50,000 systems with a computer worm that slowed down or denied 
access to applications in the most severe disruption to ever hit NMCI. Recovery from the 
attack was a testament to the touted capabilities of NMCI, because after identifying the 
problem, Naval Network Warfare Command, with its subordinate Naval Network and 
Space Operations Command, together with NMCI prime contractor EDS, worked with 
anti-virus vendor Symantec and released a recovery patch within minutes of its 
availability across the entire centralized network (Ma, 2003a). 
The network continued to survive and the pace of rollout improved to a rate of 
1,000 NMCI workstations per day. Even with the improvement of rollout rate, the 
implementation was severely behind, with less than 145,000 stations vice the 350,000 
stations expected by late 2003. The impedance to the process continued and was unique 
to each site. In one site, the seats could not be implemented because the schedule of 
implementation coincided with the deployment of Marines to Iraq. At some sites, 
asbestos in buildings slowed down the process because work had to stop while the 
harmful material was removed from the walls. Some sites presented peculiar forms of 
challenges, such as a site in Crane, IN, where an electric generator had to be added to 
support a server farm. To add the generator, the crew had to cut down some trees. But 
    22
Indiana brown bats, an endangered species, were nesting in those trees, and work had to 
stop until nesting season was over (Ma, 2003b).  
2. NMCI Turns the Corner 
NMCI continued to gain traction as the pressure from Congress started to wane 
and with the change of its leadership. In August of 2004, Rear Admiral James B. Godwin 
III succeeded Admiral Munns as the new director of the NMCI program office. As a 
former lead systems engineer and deputy program manager of the F/A-18 strike fighter 
program at the Naval Systems Command with experience as a program executive officer 
for tactical aircraft programs, Godwin brought with him practical and proven best 
business practices which he would apply to the NMCI project. The Navy would also 
restructure the NMCI program, moving oversight of all business IT, server consolidation, 
and legacy network reduction to a new program office headed up by Godwin. The move 
was designed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Navy IT acquisition (Onley, 
2005). With Admiral Godwin came changes in the SLAs as the number was slashed from 
over 200 to 37. The original NMCI contract consisted of 44 SLAs with 192 performance 
categories. The original SLAs and performance categories for NMCI delineated specific 
performance characteristics that had to be met by EDS to avoid payment penalties. In 
some cases, the terms did not provide sufficient incentives to meet requirements. EDS 
leadership often opted to fail SLAs and suffer the 15% penalty instead of suffering a 
much larger expense to meet the SLA requirements. The reduction was to make the SLAs 
more focused on end results rather than on interim steps, and to make them more 
measurable. 
The revised SLAs allowed the ailing EDS, which had reported negative cash 
flows in years 2001 through 2004 with a total of over $1 billion in losses, to eventually 
profit from the program and experience positive cash flows beginning in 2005 (Ma, 
2004). With EDS edging ahead financially for the first time since winning the contract, it 
sought more than $780 million from the Navy for unanticipated costs for Pentagon IT 
reconstitution after Sept. 11, 2001, and the expenses associated with reducing legacy 
applications. Navy leadership only agreed to a fraction of the claim and offered $100 
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million to settle the contract dispute. In March of 2006, Navy leadership and EDS finally 
worked out their differences and with the $3.1 billion contract extension making EDS the 
sole provider and operator of the intranet until 2010. The impetus to resign EDS instead 
of letting the contract expire in 2007 was the ongoing global war on terrorism. NMCI had 
become a vital part of day-to-day naval operations and the leadership felt it vital to have 
uninterrupted connectivity for users (Taylor, 2006). 
GAO report (2006) stated that about 303,000 seats were operational at about 550 
sites by June of 2006. Navy leadership claimed the current delays of implementation 
were attributed to the certification and accreditation process for all applications, as well 
as the legislation requiring certain analyses to be completed before seat deployment could 
exceed specific levels. The report further claimed that after six years and $3.7 billion, the 
Navy Marine Corps Intranet program had yet to achieve expectations. The report did not 
place the blame entirely on EDS; it also faulted Navy leadership for failure to implement 
a plan to monitor how these goals were being met. The failure of NMCI to achieve 
information superiority and collaboration through interoperability and shared services 
was cited as a blatant departure from the stated strategic goals of the intranet. 
Amid the negative reviews and with a contract in place, the leadership of the 
Navy began to contemplate the standards and requirements for an information technology 
network to succeed the multibillion-dollar NMCI after the contract expired in 2010 
(Bishnoi, 2006). After contending with the challenges of NMCI, especially the schedule 
delays and cost overruns, Navy leadership saw the prudence in diligently researching, 
clarifying and aligning the relationships between IT requirements and the acquisition 
community so as to best be able to respond efficiently to direction from higher 
authorities. To this end, the Navy established the Next Generation DON Enterprise 
Network Core Team with the primary mission of setting goals for follow-on to NMCI. 
NMCI at this point boasted over 350,000 operational seats and 52 server farms, 
representing a total of approximately 700,000 users and hundreds of servers dispersed 
globally. The Navy leadership was beginning to realize that it needed more operational 
and design control of its networks. Under the terms of NMCI, EDS owned and operated 
the network and Navy personnel had little or no control; this status quo was one of the 
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challenges that would have to be addressed with the new network. The leadership 
understood that could not undertake the implementation of an entirely new network. It 
would have to use NMCI as a “springboard” to the next thing because with NMCI costs 
at about $1.2 billion a year to run, as well as a legacy networks6, which cost an additional 
$1.5 billion, there was not much of a choice (Taylor, 2008). 
C. THE NEW BEGINNING 
1. Current State of NMCI  
The NMCI environment currently boasts over 800,000 NMCI users accounts with more 
than 400,000 seats transitioned to the end-state NMCI environment in more than 3,000 
locations dispersed over seven continents. The network facilitates the transfer of over 3.5 
terabytes of data while denying in excess of two million unauthorized access attempts 
annually. Second only to the Internet in size, and with only four decentralized network-
operating centers, the entire intranet is designed to have fail-safe security and 
redundancy. In spite of all criticism, the network has been instrumental in numerous 
capacities, such as support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the war on terrorism, with 
over 5,000 seats deployed in theater, and it has been instrumental in the formation of 
hastily formed networks during real world challenges such as Hurricanes Isabel, Katrina, 
Rita, Dolly, Gustav and Ike. Amidst the late success of NMCI emerge speculations of the 
need for change and the DON has decided to seek improvements, citing a need for the 
government to have more control over the network, providing better information 
assurance and an improved defense posture against looming advancements in cyber-
attacks.  
In the DON Naval Networking Environment 2016 report released in early 2008, 
the DON CIO defined the vision, scope, strategy, and concept of operations (CONOPS), 
for the Department of the Navy’s future Naval Networking Environment in the 2016 
timeframe. In the DON NNE-2016 report (2008), Once again it seemed that Navy 
leadership had underestimated the complexity associated with the transitioning IT and 
                                                 
6 Limited number of legacy networks were permitted to continue operations as excepted networks 
running 
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after exhaustive need analysis, determined that current NMCI management and 
associated business practices were not optimized to ensure rapid development, testing, 
and implementation of new information technologies. Both the functional needs analysis 
and functional solutions analysis showed that the contractor owned/contractor operated 
network did not allow officials to respond quickly and keep pace with emerging 
requirements and trends because making changes triggered lengthy and contract 
negotiations (Castelli, 2010). The solution reached for the current NMCI environment 
was to change the management and operation of the intranet; the new network termed 
Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) would be built by incremental buyback of 
intellectual property from Hewlett-Packard (HP)7. The Navy department planned to 
spend over $1 billion over the next several years in a block-upgrade approach (Castelli, 
2010). 
The incremental implementation of NGEN was to be phased in without disrupting 
service to any exiting capabilities, but it had to be in place before the NMCI contract 
ended in September 2010. Time passed and Navy leadership felt it could not do due 
diligence in researching, validating and application of industries best practices in 
acquisition and implementation of NGEN because, after solicitation with the sole-source 
requirement document, it received only three responses from industry and none of them 
"indicated an ability to provide the continuation of the NMCI network" (Taylor, 2008). 
Navy leaders knew that the September 2010 deadline was unattainable and would award 
a continuity-of-services contract (CoSC) to Electronic Data Systems to keep NMCI 
online for up to 43 months while the service sought a viable provider for the new network 
(Taylor, 2010). The contract extension in 2009 with Hewlett-Packard (Now EDS's parent 
company) valued in excess of $3 billion and gave the Navy time to execute a "controlled" 
transition to NGEN in a manner that minimized the possible risks to the Navy's IT 
operations and security. Under the CoSC, HP had to “ensure that the scope of services 
and performance levels delivered by NMCI in FY10 are sustained until the follow-on 
NGEN contract is in place and satisfactorily providing the replacement services” (DON, 
                                                 
7 Hewlett Packard acquired EDS in 2008 
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2009). CoSC also asserted EDS’s continued ownership and operation all of NMCI 
services in the current environment. 
2. Acquisition of NGEN 
In the procuring of NGEN, Navy leaders developed an acquisition strategy that 
allowed for several options and combinations of contracts that could be easily adjusted to 
meet current and future environments. Navy leaders hoped to increase the current level of 
command and control with NGEN and to support additional network operations while 
adjusting to find the compromise between low cost and high performance. To achieve the 
low costs, the Navy leaders first increased the number of potential providers competing 
for NGEN by reducing one of the requirements. Previous requirements prohibited 
companies that did not have previous experience operating more than 100,000 computers 
on a network. This number was reduced, based on analysis by the NGEN technical and 
management teams, to a minimum of 40,000 computers on a network (Hudson, 2012a). 
The low cost goal would also be the impetus for the segmented acquisition of NGEN. 
The Navy leadership felt that this approach would provide increased competition and 
promote security as an important part of the contracting process. In an interview, Robert 
J. Carey, then DON CIO, echoed the belief in the segmented approach: 
We studied the ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) 
process and believe it is the most logical way to proceed. Our research 
indicates that a segmented approach has become an industry best practice 
over the last few years. Segmenting the work provides greater flexibility 
for the government and increased opportunities for industry to compete to 
provide NGEN services (CHIPS, 2008). 
The segments to be competed were broken in to five sections: independent 
security operations oversight and assessment, transport, hardware, software, and 
enterprise services.  
To increase the current level of command and control and visibility of the 
network, the Navy added over 300 military personnel to facilitate future control of 
network operations of NGEN. All personnel selected would undergo intensive and 
function-specific training initially, and periodically as required, to maintain proficiency in 
their particular position. David Weddel, the assistant deputy chief of naval operations for 
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information dominance in an interview with “Inside the Navy” further explained the 
Navy’s position 
We’re adding government oversight of over 300 Navy personnel … and 
the major areas of training will include network operations, security 
operations and service life-cycle management. As (the government) begins 
to take control of the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet from contractor HPES, 
…learning how it's configured, how it's restored, the priority of restoration 
-- those are things that we will begin to exercise over the network. (Burt, 
2010)  
The Navy leadership appeared to be on one accord on the expectations of NGEN 
and on how to acquire them, but the next phase of generating a concrete and final RFP 
eluded the Navy leaders, adding delays and cost to an already encumbered process.  
a.  NGEN RFP Delayed 
Industry eagerly waited to offer a matching proposal for service in 
response to the expected RFP from naval leadership about their intended strategy and 
business objectives for NGEN. On September 30, 2011 Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command released an initial draft request for proposal for the NGEN program. 
The draft was released instead of a final RFP with the objective that naval leadership 
could deliver an final RFP in months to come that industry will be able to bid on 
(Hudson, 2011). After two more delays (five months later than planned), Navy leadership 
felt that they had to modify the contract and seek additional funding for the NMCI CoSC. 
Navy leaders were quick to establish that the additional funding was not due to an 
increase in budget need, requirements, or contract costs, but that additional funds were 
necessary to maintain NMCI CoSC services through the transition to NGEN. 
Notwithstanding an RFP delay of about five months, a deadline extension for bids from 
industry until August 2012, and a price increase of over $2 billion, Navy leaders are still 
confident that NGEN is still on schedule and will not affect planned program milestones 
(Hudson, 2012b). 
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b.  Early Transition Activities 
In addition to CoSC, Navy leaders hope to guide the transition to NGEN 
from NMCI with ETAs and new contracts. The ETAs started in October of 2008 to 
facilitate a successful migration of services from a contractor-owned, contractor-operated 
model to one that gives the government increased command and control. The ETAs are 
made up of several initiatives that will establish processes and tools used to lay the 
groundwork for a seamless transition between NMCI and NGEN (CHIPS, 2010).  
D. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to walk the reader through the acquisition and 
implementation of NMCI. The chapter highlights the historical events of the NMCI 
program, the implementation problems but the main purpose was to give context to 
subsequent chapter discussions. 
The next chapter deals with the ETA and follow-on contracts used by DON 
officials to acquire and transition to NGEN. It will provide in-depth description of what 
they are and their intended purpose as well as the effectiveness of the ETA and the 
overall transition from the NMCI to the NGEN environment.  
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III. EARLY TRANSITION ACTIVITIES AND CONTRACTS 
A. EARLY TRANSITION ACTIVITIES 
This chapter highlights the ETA and follow-on contracts to give an in-depth 
description of what they are and their intended purpose. This chapter also evaluates the 
effectiveness of the ETA and the overall transition from the NMCI to the NGEN 
environment.  
The previous chapter charted the transition process from the disparate networks to 
an integrated NMCI environment. The transition was severely impeded by the 
unexpectedly high number of legacy systems and by resistance from the stakeholders. 
The resistance from the stakeholders, that is, the negative end user response and repeated 
attacks from the legislative branch of the government, was the greatest impediment for 
the transition. With regard to the problematic NMCI implementation and considering the 
current rate of failure for transitions in organizations in recent history is between 50% 
and 70% (Pasmore, 2011), the transition has been largely successful but nowhere near 
perfect. Navy leaders understand that with a near $3 billion a year in operating cost ($1.2 
billion a year to run NMCI and $1.5 billion to run existing legacy networks), it must 
increase its control of the new Network (Taylor, 2008). In 2009, with intentions to 
transition from NMCI to NGEN, Navy leaders leveraging lessons learned from the NCMI 
transition began to develop ETAs to prepare for a successful migration of services from a 
contractor-owned, contractor-operated model to one that gives the government increased 
command and control (GAO, 2011). The eight ETAs are intended to be the foundational 
efforts to 
 establish government management capabilities; 
 allow greater participation in decisions; 
 support full and open competition for services; and 
 reduce risk through expedited transition times. 
Successful transitions are product of a deliberate approach to the process that 
includes, but is not limited to, effective communication between all stakeholders and 
clearly stated goals and objectives. With the ETAs, DON officials plan to mitigate the 
risk of migration to the NGEN segmentation service model for both industry and the 
government. 
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Figure 1.  Macro View of Transition Activities and Contracts for NGEN 
(From Holland, 2010) 
NGEN is expected to be developed incrementally, and as of September 30, 2010, 
the NGEN program had reportedly spent about $432 million, with the first increment to 
provide comparable NMCI capabilities, additional information assurance, and increased 
government control of the network (GAO, 2011). The current budgeted amount for the 
first increment is about $50 billion, and future cost estimates for subsequent increments 
have yet to be defined. Figure 1 provides a macro view of the ETAs and the contracts. 
The subsequent paragraphs provide an in-depth description of the ETAs and contracts, 
however it is important to know the ETAs are not listed in any particular order as some of 
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Table 1. Early Transition Activities (After GAO, 2010) 
Early transition activity Start date End date Cost (in millions) Description 
Information Technology 
Service Management Process 
Development 
Oct-08  May-11 $20.50 
Develop Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library a version 3-





Jan-09 Apr-11 $3.30 
Conduct job task analysis and assess 
learning tools for contractor technical 
representatives; develop enterprise-
wide position descriptions and 
occupational standards for training, 
advancement, criteria, and performance 
objectives. 
Comprehensive Facilities and 
Infrastructure Inventory  Jan-09 Dec-10 $12.00 
Evaluate, analyze, and validate current 
NMCI infrastructure inventory 
consisting of technical data, assets, 
configuration items, and system 
components. 
Defense Information System 
Network Core Extension Phase 
1 and Maritime Operation 
Center Implementation 
Apr-08 May-11 $6.70 
Bring consistent wide area network 
connectivity from the Defense 
Information System Network to eight 
major nodes at fleet headquarters 
(Norfolk, Virginia, and Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii). 
Global Network Operations 
Command and Control 
Workforce Establishment 
Oct-08  Jul-11 $14.30 
Develop the personnel, processes, and 
tool requirements, and organizational 
analysis and alignment. 
Wide Area Network and 
Enterprise Services Upgrade Apr-09  Aug-12 $46.00 
Demonstrate network operational 
control capability and validate the 
NGEN System Design baseline 
through early implementation. 
Enterprise Tools Strategy and 
Implementation/Integration Apr-09 May-11 $56.60 
Analyze current tool capabilities to 
support information technology service 
management processes, and develop 
design requirements and tool 
integration specifications. 
Non-classified Internet Protocol 
Router Network Migration – 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
IT Support Centers East Pilot 
Oct-09  Aug-11 $12.90 
Assess the transition of base area 
network, local area network, and end-
user equipment for about 1,200 users 
from the continuity of services contract 
to the government-owned/government 
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1. ETA 1A: Information Technology Service Management (ITSM) 
Process Development 
Navy leadership has adopted several measures to ensure operational control 
across its IT enterprise as it prepares for a full and open competition of NGEN services. 
One of the ETAs used to lay the groundwork for a smooth transition is the decision to 
enhance its insights of proven industry standards such as information technology service 
management (ITSM). ITSM is a set of actions that are concerned with the delivery and 
support of IT services that are appropriate to the business requirements of an organization 
(Addy, 2010). ITSM seeks to standardize the business process, activities and roles; 
common definitions are established in documents, repeatable procedures are 
implemented, and clearly defined roles for all stakeholders are established. To improve 
deficiency resolution, ITSM process focuses on the quality of service offered to the user 
by evaluation of quantifiable and technical metrics determined from IT characteristics 
such as throughput and response time.  
The ITSM process will be based on current industry information technology 
infrastructure library (ITIL V3) standards. ITIL V3 is the latest iteration of what has 
become an international standard or library of a cohesive set of best practices for 
information technology service management drawn from the public and private sectors 
worldwide (Cervone, 2008). The standards and procedures listed in the ITIL V3 are 
entirely generic and DON intends to apply the process and procedures to support its 
controlled network operations and management. The NGEN Requirements Task Force in 
the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) Requirements Document (2008), 
acknowledged the absence of standards for ITSM implementation. The task force further 
accentuated the dependence of successful implementation of IT service management on 
established IT governance and IT support. 
IT governance will be pivotal in the centralized oversight of knowledge 
management, service asset, and configuration management, event management and 
portfolio management. Currently the IT governance is a joint effort between the NGEN 
program office and the Naval Network Warfare Command to ensure adequate 
government oversight, IT conformance, and standardization and integration of processes 
across all segment of the NGEN environment. Standardization and integration of the 
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processes synchronizes ITSM’s effort at enterprise level, which creates an avenue for 
compliant and repeatable procedures that can be incorporated in training specifications 
for the government and contractors (CHIPS, 2010). This process mitigates duplication 
and stove-piped efforts and leads to consistency of ITSM operations across NGEN 
stakeholders. 
Although DON leaders have assigned program life cycles with specific funds and 
managed by an integrated product team (IPT), the information technology service 
management process development effort estimated at over $20 million dollars and a 
duration of three years after the start date in October 2008 will continue until NGEN 
reaches its full operating capability (CHIPS, 2010). 
2. ETA 4: Comprehensive Facilities & Infrastructure Inventory 
This ETA entails a comprehensive facilities and infrastructure inventory that 
seeks to evaluate, analyze, and validate current NMCI infrastructure inventory consisting 
of technical data, assets, configuration items, and system components. Navy leaders 
believe this to be one of the vital ETAs because it will adequately inform the NGEN 
request for information/request for proposal activities by creating a comprehensive asset 
database of NMCI’s core infrastructure (CHIPS, 2010). The process will capture the 
information necessary to establish an enterprise infrastructure asset baseline of the 
current NMCI infrastructure. This process, commonly referred to as IT asset management 
(ITAM), is part of the guidance from the ITIL V3 procedures and it involves the 
complete inventory of all IT assets, to include but not limited to:  
 All IP enabled, networked devices 
 Device operating systems and types (servers, desktops, printers, routers, 
IP-enabled devices) 
 System configuration data (CPU, memory, serial number, etc.)  
 Installed software and services (vendor, version, patch level) 
 Software application and database users and usage rate (application, users, 
etc.) 
 Server utilization rate (NGEN, 2008a) 
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ITAM is fundamentally the collection of on-hand hardware and software 
inventory information intended to facilitate future hardware and software purchases and 
redistribution. The application of ITAM not only ensures that all assets are accounted for, 
but also assesses the capabilities and the limitations as well as verifies efficient use of all 
assets. DON will utilize asset management to determine the level and value of its ready-
to-use assets. According to the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) 
Requirements Document (2008): 
ITAM will be employed to inventory Navy enterprise IT networks on a 
recurring basis to maintain accuracy, capture mobile or temporarily off-
line assets, and identify trends in configuration changes. Detailed and 
comprehensive data for networked assets will be automatically collected 
and reported via secure communications protocols and ports and then 
stored in a centralized repository under control of the government in 
accordance with appropriate government security classification guidelines. 
(DON, 2008a) 
DON believes the ITAM process is vital to NGEN and the move to a consolidated 
management environment. Its application will aid in mitigating the excessive costs and 
providing better visibility for monitoring and management of the enterprise (CHIPS, 
2010). To that end, the assessment, implementation and integration process was budgeted 
at over $56 million; the highest amount budgeted for the ETAs.  
3. ETA1B: Tools Strategy and Implementation/Integration  
This is a follow-on to the comprehensive facilities and infrastructure inventory 
and utilizes inventory information to determine how best an asset can be configured into 
the larger networked enterprise. The goal of this ETA is to analyze current tool 
capabilities to support ITSM processes, and develop design requirements and tool 
integration specifications that lead to technical solutions. This process is also rooted in 
the ITIL V3 procedures under the service asset and configuration management (SACM).  
Under the ITIL V3, SACM consists of an iterative process of configuration 
identification, configuration control, configuration verification and audit. The ITIL V3 
procedure for SACM defines the initial structure of the configuration model by defining 
all configuration items (CIs) and their sub-components, as well as determining their 
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interrelationships (ITIL, n.d.). This base configuration is then documented in the 
configuration management system to ensure that any future changes are consonant with 
the base system. The iterative portion of SACM is the configuration verification and 
audit, and it is executed by performing regular checks to ensure that the information 
contained in the configuration management system is an exact representation of the CIs 
actually installed in the live production environment. 
Navy leaders acknowledge its ambitious task of SACM as they seek to 
synchronize NGEN, first into the Naval Networks Environment Family of Systems, and 
further down the line with the Global Information Grid; the System of Systems. NGEN 
Requirements Document (2008) argues that the application of SACM is within this 
system of systems, and family of systems construct is critically important to enable the 
operation of legacy and emerging applications, systems, and services within a DoD and 
DON net-centric enterprise and to support warfighter mission requirements from end-to-
end. Adequate attention to validating requirements and the configuration of NGEN as it 
pertains to capabilities and interoperability will pay a great dividend with respect to 
systems integration.  
4. ETA 1C: Global NetOps C2 Workforce Establishment  
Started in January 2009, this ETA seeks to bridge the gap between current 
manning and the desired level for the effective operation of NGEN. DON leadership 
understands that current personnel are not sufficiently trained to meet the needs required 
to have adequate oversight in a government-owned networked environment, given its size 
and complexity. Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) Requirements Document 
(2008a) identifies the gap as a combination of the number of personnel and degree of 
competency in technical and process maturity capability (p.5).  
The activity will develop enterprise-wide position descriptions and occupational 
standards for standardized training, advancement criteria and performance objectives 
based on DoD Directive (DoDD) 8570.01-M, the premier document for guidance on DoD 
Information Assurance Training, Certification, and Workforce Management. DoD 
8570.1-M (2007) identifies and categorizes positions and certification of personnel 
conducting information assurance (IA) functions within the DoD workforce supporting 
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the DoD global information grid (GIG) in accordance with overarching DoD directives.
8
 
The requirement for adequate workforce began as a phased approach in 2005, and after 
its fourth year it mandates that all IT initiatives must be in 100% compliance with 
8570.1M, further specifying that the DoD requires approximately 110,000 identified IA 
professionals to be certified. 
In order to assure that the NGEN Workforce is DoD 8570 1 compliant, DON 
leadership plans to conduct a job task analysis and assess learning tools for contractor 
technical representatives to develop enterprise-wide position descriptions and 
occupational standards for training, advancement, criteria, and performance objectives 
(GAO, 2011). 
5. ETA 9: Defense Information System Network Core Extension Phase 1  
DON leadership understands to operate and sustain NGEN, a highly complex and 
large system, it must first develop and fortify a resilient, robust and consistent wide area 
network. The leadership feels that the first step in this process is to identify external and 
internal factors that affect the network, and then these factors have to be evaluated and 
assessed for levels of risk. Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) Requirements 
Document (2008) identified the two major external factors affecting the proposed NGEN 
networks as electric power supply and availability of DoD-provided services on the 
Defense Information System Network (DISN) (p. 50). The availability of services such as 
graceful degradation, dynamic rerouting, and end-to-end protection, and the denial of 
electrical power will have a significant, if not critical, impact on NGEN availability.  
To improve the infrastructure already in place, DON will increase connectivity 
from the DISN to eight major nodes at fleet headquarters (Norfolk, Virginia, and Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii) by deploying DISN WAN with intent of enhancing quality of service for 
tactical and non-tactical areas of NMCI/NGEN (Holland, 2010). NGEN Requirements 
Document (2008) recommends a development of assessment plans to identify all data 
collection on specific nodes and linkages using appropriate measurements of 
effectiveness (MOE) and measurements of performance to capture how effective NGEN 
                                                 
8 DoD Directive 8000.1, “Management of DoD Information Resources and Information Technology,” 
February 27, 2002 and DoD Directive 8500.1, “Information Assurance,” October 24, 2002 
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is in its support of the naval user community. This ETA was scheduled to begin in April 
of 2008 with duration of three years and at a budgeted cost of $6.7 million dollars. 
6. ETA 5: Contract Technical Representative (CTR) Workforce 
Reconstitution 
The goal of this ETA is to map the transition of a contractor-operated 
environment to a government-controlled environment by doing an “AS-IS” work analysis 
and manpower development process currently in play to align the contract technical 
representative workforce with NGEN acquisition and mission strategies. The analysis 
will identify current roles and define future define NGEN CTR roles and responsibilities, 
as well as training requirements, to meet NGEN performance expectations.  
Navy leaders will use contractors already in place during the transition to ensure 
required support during initial operational capability (IOC) equipment installation and 
operations. The transition to government owned and operated will be phased in and based 
on the mandated performance-based business environment; performance-based logistic 
documents which mandate will be provided by current trained and certified contractors to 
satisfy sustainment support requirements for IOC to the degree practical. The NGEN 
Requirements Document (2008) mandates contractor logistics support as the standard 
approach for IOC due to the few number of government (Navy and civilian) personnel 
trained and validated to use and maintain NGEN. 
7. USMC ETA 1: USMC Upgrade WAN & Implement Enterprise 
Services 
According to the NGEN Network Operations (NetOps) and Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) (2008), the 85,000 unclassified seats currently supported by 
NMCI services on USMC installations will be transitioned to the NGEN environment. 
The USMC ETA (1) will replace and refresh exiting Marine Corps enterprise network 
(MCEN) infrastructure items at each Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) IT 
Support Center (MITSC). MITSCs are generally provisioned within a Marine Corps 
Installation Commands to support Marine Expeditionary Force Commands and, as part of 
the fifth element of the MAGTF, to support the warfighter while operationally deployed, 
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in garrison, or engaged in training. After the MITSCs have been updated, they will be 
validated to the standards of the NGEN system design baseline and demonstrate network 
operational control capability through early implementation. The upgrade of MCEN to 
NGEN at all the MITSCs is budgeted for $46.00 million. 
8. USMC ETA 2: USMC NIPRNET Migration - MITSC East Pilot 
Under the NGEN environment, the network will be divided into two management 
domains (MDs). The MDs set the boundaries within NGEN for management authority for 
purposes of command and control. This ETA provides guidelines for Marine Corps 
Network Operations and Security Command, the USMC NGEN MD, as the marines 
transition enterprise seat services from the incumbent vendor to a government-owned/ 
government-operated model. This pilot program involves the assumption of control on 
the base area network (BAN), the local area network and the migration of end-users to 
the Marine Corps Worldwide Active Directory, management and sustainment processes, 
and the transition of user workstations for approximately 1,200 users. (CHIPS, 2010) 
Naval leadership intends to spend $12.90 million to implement the pilot program 
after the upgrade and validation of the MITSC at Camp Lejeune, Marine Corps 
Installations Headquarters East. This pilot program will undergo a full operational 
capability test and evaluation, and any lessons gleaned will serve as a model for the entire 
Marine Corps. 
B. CONTRACTS 
GAO report (2012a) asserts the Office of the Secretary of Defense gave acquisition 
approval of the NGEN with an emphasis on segmentation of the network elements. Each 
segment represents an allocation of IT services, functions, tools, and roles and 
responsibilities associated with end-to-end service delivery that will be provided by 
contractors or government sources fielded through multiple competitive awards. The 
Navy leadership understands segmentation of the network creates seams that must be 
managed effectively to ensure successful delivery and continuity of services. The two 
primary segments expected to be awarded are enterprise services and transport services 
and the remaining three segments are end user hardware; enterprise software licenses, 
and independent security operations, oversight and assessment support. 
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1. Contract for Transport Services  
This contract was awarded to provide for the operation and sustainment of the 
transport infrastructure, associated services, and level-of-effort support for those services. 
Transport infrastructure includes items such as cables, routers, and switches, and end-user 
equipment such as computers, monitors, keyboards and software. Further definition of 
Transport Services extends to devices and hardware that provide data storage, transport 
of voice and data, and video teleconferencing. Included in the contract is the provision to 
provide technology refresh of cable plant, routers, and switches; some leasehold 
improvements; and moveable infrastructure associated with local network operations. 
The contract will be in consonance with aforementioned asset management and will 
provide infrastructure as government furnished equipment. 
2. Contract for Enterprise Services  
With the enterprise services contract, DON leaders will seek to understand and 
integrate the complex and diverse applications and data of the current NMCI 
environment, and finally to integrate end-user seat components, especially the hardware. 
As the premier integration tool in NGEN, the contract is designed to cover coordination 
across all vendors for the successful delivery of NGEN services. The contract will also 
provide the enterprise service desk, seat services supporting end user devices, and data 
center services such as storage and e-mail, along with hardware and software specific to 
current enterprise services that are not covered under the end user hardware and 
enterprise software licenses segments (GAO, 2012a).  
Though still viewed as separate segments, DON officials will procure the 
transport and enterprise services segments simultaneously in order to potentially reduce 
labor costs, administrative burdens, and risk. DON officials identified both transport and 
enterprise services as fundamentally related under NMCI, and will award a combined 
contract for both segments (GAO, 2012a). The report further states the transport and 
enterprise services segments will be awarded simultaneously after approval of Milestone 
C decision DON instead of staggering their implementation.  
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3. Contract for Enterprise Software Licenses  
This contract will provide software licenses for government purpose rights license 
for NMCI technical data, computer software, and computer software documentation as 
part of the ETA and to meet DON-wide requirements. Use of enterprise license 
agreements (ELAs), where available, is mandatory by all DON organizations and 
programs with the release of a joint DON memo (DON ELA 2012). These enterprise 
agreements optimize cost savings by leveraging the full purchasing capacity of the 
department. The contract will require that all software for NGEN be procured as 
commodities through the DoD Enterprise Software Initiative
9
. The contract will ensure 
the maximum use of DoD-standards-compliant software and commercial-off-the shelf 
products for NGEN.  
4. Contract for End-User Hardware  
For this contract, DON officials will use two different approaches for the USN and 
USMC domain. According to GAO report (2012), DON officials will acquire end user 
hardware as a service from the enterprise services contractor rather than purchase the 
equipment and provide it as government-furnished property to the contractor. The initial 
plans was to acquire existing end user hardware owned by the incumbent and provide it 
to the enterprise services contractor as government-furnished property or acquire the end 
user hardware from the enterprise services contractor as a service. The Marine Corps will 
obtain end user hardware from Marine Corps common hardware suite as part of the 
government-owned and government-operated mode of the delivering NGEN services. 
The requirement for both the USN domain and USMC domain, however, is that all 
components acquired have to comply with DoD policies and regulations, and satisfy 
commercial and international standards set forth by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers. 
                                                 
9 The Enterprise Software Initiative (ESI) is a joint DoD project to develop and implement a 
DoD enterprise-wide Software Asset Management process. 
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5. Contract for Independent Security Operations Oversight and 
Assessment (ISOOA) 
The ISOOA contract was originally envisioned as services to be provided by an 
independent third-party security provider for the NMCI environment as it transitioned to 
NGEN within the USN domain, and for organic Marine Corps forces to provide USMC 
security functions (GAO, 2012a). With recent changes in the acquisition approach, the 
USN is no longer expected to award a contract for the verification, validation, and 
reporting segment because the Navy now has an internal entity—the 10th Fleet/Cyber 
Command
10
 (GAO, 2012a). The USMC will continue to perform its security operations 
oversight and assessment. 
With the ETAs and the contracts, the naval leaders proceeded to move from the 
current NMCI construct to NGEN, promising that the best possible levels of service 
quality and availability would be sustained. NGEN is envisioned as a network-centric 
force multiplier for the warfighter by facilitating a secure, reliable, and adaptable global 
information exchange across the full spectrum of operations. The ETAs have a spiral 
development process ensuring that problems are identified and addressed rapidly, and the 
segmented approach award system is an attempt to acquire NGEN at the “best value” 
using the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA)
11
 as basis for award. 
                                                 
10 The U.S. Fleet Cyber Command / U.S. 10th Fleet is a functional formation of the United States 
Navy responsible for the Navy’s cyber warfare programs. 
11 Based on FAR 15.101–2… which states (a) the lowest price technically acceptable source selection 
process is appropriate when best value is expected to result from selection of the technically acceptable 
proposal with the lowest evaluated price. 
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Figure 2.  NGEN Segmented Solution (From Holland, 2010) 
According to DON program officials, the decisions to proceed with the transition 
were based on their view that all the efforts had sufficiently mitigated known risks and 
issues considering the length of the transition process, albeit one laden with complexities, 
and taking into account the sheer magnitude of the network (GAO, 2010).  
As of the time of the GAO report dated September 2012, the transition is plagued 
with schedule delays and it seems unlikely that the DON will fully transition to NGEN by 
the end of the continuity of services contract in April 2014. 
C. GAO ASSESSMENT 
As the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of the United States Congress, the 
GAO was directed by Congress to ensure the DON had sufficiently analyzed alternative 
acquisition approaches and had demonstrated that a reliable schedule for executing the 
program was in place. Furthermore, DON was to show that its program acquisition 
decisions were grounded in DoD performance and risk-mitigated methods (GAO, 2010). 
To do this, GAO personnel reviewed the NGEN analysis of alternatives (AoA),
12
 
                                                 
12 Analysis of alternatives is the analytical comparison of multiple alternatives to be completed before 
committing resources to one project. 
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integrated master schedule, and key milestone
13
 decisions. Figure 4 gives an overview of 
the acquisition life cycle process with the different milestones. 
 
Figure 3.  Acquisition Process with Milestones Overview (From DAU, n.d.) 
In the subsequent report, GAO officials showed that though DON officials had 
well-documented cost estimates, the overall NGEN acquisition approach was not 
grounded in a reliable analysis of alternatives approach, the timely execution of the 
program was lacking due to a poorly derived integrated master schedule and this 
culminated in patterns of missed milestones, and delays in key program documentation 
and gate review decisions. 
1. Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
According to Defense Acquisition University: Introduction to defense acquisition 
management (2008) analysis of alternatives (AoA) 
…is a process that assesses and evaluates potential materiel solutions with 
intentions to satisfy the requirements or needs documented in an approved 
Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). It focuses on identification and 
analysis of alternatives, measures of effectiveness (MOE), cost, schedule, 
concepts of operations, and overall risk, including the sensitivity of each 
alternative to possible changes in key assumptions or variables. The AoA 
also assesses critical technology elements (CTE) associated with each 
                                                 
13 Milestones are a point in time where a recommendation is made to the Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA) about starting or continuing an acquisition program into the next phase.  DoDI 5000.02 
“Operation of the Defense Acquisition System” establishes the milestones and milestone requirements. 
    44
proposed materiel solution, including technology maturity, integration 
risk, manufacturing feasibility, and, where necessary, technology 
maturation and demonstration needs. (DAU, 2008)  
 
During Gate 2 of the DON review process done concurrently with the DoD 
materiel solution analysis (MSA), the findings from pertinent AoA are used to approve 
the preferred alternatives resulting from the analysis. For the acquisition of NGEN the 
Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD CAPE), issued the NGEN AoA guidance, reviewed the AoA study plan, and 
approved the AoA results. 
GAO determined that DON and DoD officials failed in executing an effective 
AoA because (1) it contained key weaknesses in its cost estimation, and (2) it did not 
sufficiently assess operational effectiveness. These two fundamental disadvantages 
impaired DON officials’ ability to inform investment decision-making.  
a. Cost Estimation Weakness 
As a core tenet of AoA, the evaluation of the potential cost expected is vetted on 
the premise that the alternative chosen is sound and proven, and also that it has the met 
the requirement of being the “lowest price technically acceptable.” The GAO report 
(2011a) argued that the method of cost estimation for the chosen alternative was flawed 
because it did not use historical records that cited actual cost and schedule experiences on 
comparable programs. This failure to make grounded estimates and the consequent 
approval by OSD CAPE, which had concluded that the DON’s AoA was sufficient, led to 
designation of the first increment of NGEN as a major automated information system 
(MAIS)
14
 (GAO, 2010). The cost estimation analysis was to determine the extent to 
                                                 
14 Designation for all systems of computer hardware, computer software, data and/or 
telecommunications that perform functions such as collecting, processing, storing, transmitting and 
displaying information that exceeds $378 million (FY 2000 constant dollars) for all expenditures, for all 
increments, regardless of appropriation or fund source, directly related to the AIS definition, design, 
development, deployment, operations and maintenance, and incurred from the beginning of the MSA phase 
through sustainment for the estimated useful life of the system. 
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which AoA had measured up to the four characteristics
15
 of a reliable estimate
 
promulgated in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.  
The GAO report (2010) concluded that DON officials had a well-documented 
AoA with a defined purpose of the estimate to include program background, system 
description, disclosed ground rules and assumptions, but failed to deliver a 
comprehensive analysis that included all government (e.g., personnel) and contractor 
costs over the program’s full life cycle (from inception to retirement). Instead, the DON 
officials provided analysis on government and contractor costs for a five-year period 
from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2015. DON officials also failed to provide accurate 
estimates; though based on NMCI historical cost data and adjusted for inflation, the 
estimates contained mathematical mistakes and were largely grounded in documented 
assumptions. Attempts to verify accuracy were thwarted due to the proprietary data of the 
contractor being used for the independent government review. The final cost estimation 
weakness was attributed to the lack of credibility due to quality of data used. The data 
used to conduct analysis was often based on the contractor’s experience and not an 
independent third party observation. In response to the claim by GAO analysis, lower 
level officials blamed the discrepancies on insufficient time given to conduct a more 
thorough analysis.  
b. Insufficient Assessment of Operational Effectiveness 
According to DoD regulations
16
 governing proper analysis of alternatives, 
all assessments must include identification of core operational capabilities and goals to be 
achieved by the system solution, establishment of quantitative or qualitative measures (or 
both) for evaluating the operational effectiveness of each alternative, and a definition of 
each alternative metric to evaluate the ability of the alternative to meet the measures 
established.  
                                                 
15 Determines if a cost estimate is well documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. 
 
16 Defense Acquisition Guidebook; Section 3.3 “Analysis of Alternatives” (Mar. 19, 2010); DON 
Acquisition and Capabilities Guidebook (December 2008).   
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GAO report (2010) credited DON officials for identifying the capabilities 
and goals that the NGEN system solution should achieve, but claimed the analysis fell 
short in establishing quantitative and qualitative measures for the capabilities identified. 
Instead it compared the alternatives based on qualitative determinations of whether the 
capability or goal was either met or partially met. DON officials accountable for 
developing the AoA attributed the inadequate operational effectiveness analysis to time 
constraints brought on by the demands for a timely delivery of the requests for proposals. 
GAO officials maintained their position on the failure of DON and DoD 
officials executing an effective AoA because of the weaknesses in cost estimation and 
insufficient assessments of the operational effectiveness and further cited the 
shortcomings of a time-constrained approach to analysis of alternatives. GAO officials 
also argued that the scope of an alternatives analysis should be proportionate to the 
amount of resources affected by the decision, with more significant programs receiving 
more analytical attention, an approach grounded in DoD guidance (GAO, 2011a)  
Top DON and DoD officials immediately refuted time constraint 
statements by GAO with OSD officials stating that the differences between the current 
approach and the alternatives that were assessed are, in their view, insignificant. Without 
a credible AoA and with a nebulous assertion to increased flexibility among the 
alternatives, DON officials went on to select a segmented approach to provide the touted 
increased flexibility in meeting NGEN capabilities and goals with no additional cost. 
GOA officials still maintain the current approach is estimated to cost at least $4.7 billion 
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Figure 4.  DON’s Qualitative Assessment of Alternatives’ Ability to Meet NGEN Capabilities and Goals (From GAO, 2010)  
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Figure 5.  NGEN Major Milestone Delay (From GAO, 2012)  
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c. Untimely Execution 
As of December 2011, DON officials reported a completion of all ETAs; 
the several initiatives that sought to define processes and tools used to lay the 
groundwork for a seamless transition between NMCI and NGEN. At the time of the GAO 
2012 report on NGEN, several of the contracts that were intended to facilitate the actual 
delivery of services for NGEN had been delayed several months, severely undermining 
ability to fully transition by the end of the continuity of services contract in April 2014. 
Program officials blamed the delays to the NGEN program on the need for 
additional planning, constraints with staffing limitations, and frequent revisions to the 
request for proposals, and they feared that the program transition from its existing system 
to NGEN would face further delays and cost overruns. GAO officials concurred with the 
high probability of future delays, citing previous reviews that revealed an absence of a 
reliable schedule for executing NGEN. In previews review, GAO claimed the DON 
schedule for the program execution failed in comparison to best practices associated with 
developing and maintaining a reliable schedule. The review suggested the effective 
implementation of the best practices revealed critical paths that increased the probability 
of negating delays associated with the completion of NGEN events and milestones, 
including multiple major acquisition reviews and program plans. Review of the schedule 
for NGEN execution revealed only two of the four sub schedules adequately satisfied any 
of the nine practices
17
 that are associated with developing and maintaining a reliable 
schedule (GAO, 2010). 
                                                 
17 The nine best practices identified aid in developing and maintaining reliable schedules for 
interdependent and complex projects. These are (1) capturing all activities, (2) sequencing all activities, (3) 
assigning resources to all activities, (4) establishing the duration of all activities, (5) integrating schedule 
activities horizontally and vertically, (6) establishing the critical path for all activities, (7) identifying 
reasonable “float” between activities, (8) conducting a schedule risk analysis, and (9) updating the schedule 
using logic and durations. 
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d. Segmented Approach 
DON officials chose to use a segmented approach to acquiring IT services 
through the competitive award of multiple contracts for local transport, hardware, 
software and enterprise services. The decision was based on best practices currently used 
by Fortune 500 CIOs for IT acquisition (NEN, n.d.). A segment approach refers to the 
strategic allocation of IT services, functions, tools, and roles and responsibilities 
associated with end-to-end service delivery. DON officials selected this approach on the 
basis that it would provide increased flexibility in meeting NGEN capabilities and goals 
with no additional cost (GAO, 2011). 
GAO officials’ evaluation of the segmented approach revealed increased 
risks of delivering components of IT services through multiple contracts. GAO officials 
maintain that the risks stem from the deficient AoA, which did not include risk 
evaluations associated with the segmented approach. The most egregious flaw 
determined by the GAO report was that the approach currently being pursued by DON 
was not one of the alternatives assessed in the AoA (GAO, 2011). 
In the subsequent GAO report (2012) the program was flagged as a “high 
risk” due to the lack of defined roles and relationships among segments and government 
functions. The apparent lacks of defined seam management will increase the level of risk 
and will be detrimental to the life cycle development and implementation of NGEN.  
D. CONCLUSION 
GAO officials reviewed the intended ETAs and contracts and concluded that the 
acquisition decisions were not always performance or risk based. DoD, DON and OSD 
officials felt they had sufficiently mitigated known risks and issues and had advanced the 
program in spite of the apparent shortfalls and risks. The entire program was plagued by a 
lack of defined requirements, time constraints, and inadequate analysis of alternatives but 
was always approved at a key acquisition review. Risks identified in the past materialized 
into critical issues that have stagnated the transition efforts and added several billions of 
dollars to the estimated cost at completion.  
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IV. NGEN AND NMCI: THE COMMON GROUND 
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” 
—Philosopher George Santayana 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 When the DON was implementing NMCI, a study done by the Standish Group
18
 
International revealed that out of 7,400 IT implementation projects evaluated, 34% were 
late or over budget, 31% abandoned, scaled back or modified, and only 24% were 
completed on time and on budget (Cunningham, 1999). In 2005, in a report published by 
the Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Consulting Firm
19
 of IT implementation across 
600 organizations in 22 countries found that within a 12-month period, 49% of 
organizations had suffered a recent project failure with only 2% of organizations 
reporting success in achieving desired benefits. In 2008, OMB painted an equally bleak 
picture of the state of over 400 federal government IT projects; with over $25.2 billion in 
expenditures for fiscal year 2008, the projects were listed as poorly planned, poorly 
performing or both (GAO, 2008). 
 For all the reasons that lead to failures in implementing IT, many experts agree 
that poor management of organizational change is the key contributor to incomplete or 
otherwise unsuccessful IT implementations (Gibson, 2003; Umble & Umble, 2003). This 
poor management can manifest in inadequate planning of management activities and 
controls, especially a lack of single-point accountability for deliverables, resulting in the 
project failing to meet its objectives (Fuerst & Cheney, 1982). Others believe success in 
IT projects cannot be defined only in terms of achieving time, cost and quality objectives, 
but must also have the objective of meeting stakeholders’ expectations, in particular, the 
client/user. Therefore, managing the expectations of stakeholders is a critical 
                                                 
18 The Standish Group is an IT research-focused organization based in Boston, MA. It is a premier IT 
leader in project and value performance with dedicated professionals with years of practical experience in 
assessing risk, cost, return and value IT investments. 
19 Renamed BearingPoint on October 2, 2002, Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) is one of 
the largest professional services firms spun off the consulting unit of KMPG as KPMG Consulting, LLC. 
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management strategy that should be treated with urgency (Bryson, 2004; Bennatan, 
2002). Failure is also attributed to unrealistic, incomplete, and dynamic requirements, and 
some experts argue that it is increasingly urgent to specify requirements in order to utilize 
IT resources effectively within a project’s timescale (Ward & Elvin, 1999; Baccarini, 
Salm & Love, 2004). Other failure causes include technology and technical issues, 
unpredictable external factors, political circumstances, and politically motivated requests 
embedded in the project, which become difficult to manage and meet objectives. 
Sometimes the projects are not viable due to economic circumstances, and unpredictable 
human behavior may also sabotage a project. 
This chapter cannot address all the reasons that contribute to the failures of 
implementing IT in complex organizations. However, it will attempt to address the 
underlying issues with implementation of stakeholder management, requirements, and 
personnel management that plagued the implementation of NMCI and continue to plague 
the transition to NGEN. The analyses in this chapter will be done using a variation of the 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis template.  The basic 
SWOT described by the originator Albert Humphrey, was a derivative of research 
conducted to by the Stanford Research institute to evaluate change management in 
organizations (SRI, 2005). Current use SWOT analysis is primarily structured as 
planning method used to evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats 
of decision based objectives for new ventures in organizations. For this chapter SWOT 
will be used retroactively to assess previous IT implementation strengths and weaknesses. 
The SWOT analysis will also recommend future opportunities assessing internal and 
external conditions have influence on achieving the successful implementation of NGEN 
This chapter will recommend holistic change management practices that take into 
account the various stakeholders and the change process and leverage on key 
interdependencies. The application of a more robust model that aligns resources and 
activities and provides means to identify critical paths can provide a testable model 
applicable to all phases of IT change in United States government.  
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B. FAILURES IN IMPLEMENTING IT 
1. Stakeholders Expectation 
 Freeman (1984) defines any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the organization's objectives as stakeholders. More detailed 
definitions from Kanter, Stein, & Jick (1992) ascribe the group responsible for 
identifying the need for change, creating a vision and specifying a desired outcome, and 
then making it happen as change agents, and the group responsible for implementing, 
adopting, or adapting to the change as the change recipients. Hannon (2004) further 
defines the group by three relationship attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency. 
Figure 6 captures the qualitative classes of stakeholders, the nature of the relationship 
attributes, and the overlaps that might be present when seeking to identify relevant 
stakeholders. The stakeholders are classified as the groups with the ability to influence 
the organization; those with legitimacy and that are vital to the organization, and those 
with a claim that demands immediate attention. For the purpose of this paper, the term 
“stakeholder” is used to capture all the groups that induce change and the groups that 
receive and respond to elements of change in an organization. 
 The challenge of the different stakeholder groups is the disparity in expectations 
resulting from the required negotiation and appeasement of all stakeholders with the 
intent of achieving a common ground to pursue the project goals and maintain the project 
management effort. Further exacerbating the already daunting challenge is the manner in 
which the stakeholders view the level of their power and influence on the project. 
Stakeholders view their role in a project differently based on socially constructed realities 
forged and enforced by multiple perceptions of the members of each stakeholder group 
(Hannon, 2004). Hannon (2004) further argues that for a project to be successful, the 
stakeholders’ criteria of satisfaction have to be met.  
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Figure 6.  Qualitative Classes of Stakeholders (After Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997).  
The main stakeholders associated with the change from the disparate networks to 
NMCI included the legislative branch of the government, senior naval officials, the end-
users, and the vendors (external service contracts). The struggles of the NMCI 
implementation have been discussed in prior chapters, but when subjected to stakeholder 
analysis, the predominant perception is one that reveals a chasm; stakeholders imposing 
the change and stakeholders affected by the change.  
For NGEN, the stakeholders are very much same as NMCI’s though senior naval 
officials have reserved the option to outsource to multiple agencies for the transition of 
the network. DON intends to use multiple vendors to provide the planned segmented 
approach for NGEN capabilities. The intent of a multiple-vendor approach is to mitigate 
excessive financial cost to the government by vendor competition, and, as a secondary 
consequence, improve the services provided for NGEN. This measure could possibly 
displace HP as the primary facilitator of the network and add more vendors.  
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a. Strengths 
In the indelible words of the U.S. Constitution, the legislative arm of the 
government is “To raise and support Armies … and to provide and maintain a Navy” 
(U.S. Const. art. I, § 8). The expectation for the past 237 years has been that as the only 
governing authority that can appropriate taxpayers’ dollars, Congress disburses funds to 
the DoD through the annual Defense Appropriations Act to support and maintain defense 
operations. The DoD in turn is accountable to Congress and responsible for reporting on 
all funding allocated to activities within the departments. The reciprocity of the 
relationship between the legislative branch and DoD ensures checks and balances in a 
complex environment, and that stakeholder interests (i.e., the common defense of the 
homeland) are upheld.  
Today, DoD is one of the largest and most complex organizations in the 
world, with operations consisting of over $1.8 trillion in assets, $2.2 trillion in liabilities, 
and over 3.2 million military and civilian personnel with annual disbursements of over 
$947 billion (GAO, 2010). To cope with its size and complexity, DoD has developed and 
continues to add to a vast library of instructions and directives that govern its personnel 
and their execution of policies, resources and requirements, acquisitions, and fleet 
readiness to include support and field operations. Instructions and directives such as the 
Naval Military Personnel Manual explicitly define the nature of interactions amongst 
members of DoD, setting a baseline expectation and providing structure and uniformity. 
In spite of the large number of military and civilian personnel within DoD, 
the department does not have employees in sufficient numbers with all the skills to meet 
every requirement, and it has to award external service contracts (vendors), which are 
essential for carrying out the myriad of functions required by DoD (GAO, 1991). As with 
DoD members, there are instructions that set the baseline level of expectations for all 
recipients of external service contracts. One of the documents that set the level of 
expectation for contractors and vendors is the RFP, which is mandated by the Federal 
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Acquisition Regulations (FAR).
20
 The RFP is a formal solicitation used in negotiated 
acquisition to communicate government requirements to prospective vendors and to 
solicit proposals (FAR 15.203). A properly written RFP will contain elements such as the 
statement of work, which describes what services the government wants supplied and the 
nature and scope of the tasks being requested. It also defines the nature of the 
relationship; how the government contracting officer and the vendor will interact, how 
information will be exchanged administratively, and the terms of payments (usually tied 
to expectations of performance and delivery of services). 
The U.S. government has sought to eliminate speculation from all of its 
overarching activities and processes by providing baseline guidelines and instructions. 
The result is a visible and dependable structure of operations where there is an explicit 
understanding of the expectations and requirements for its members and service 
contractors. On the macro level, the government has the right mechanisms in place to 
address its stakeholders and this can be seen on the micro levels with formation of 
working groups such as the NGEN System Program Office (SPO). The Chief of Naval 
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the NGEN SPO, a first-
of-its-kind organization in the DON, because it sought to bring relevant stakeholders (i.e., 
policy, resources and requirements, acquisition, and fleet readiness, support and 
operations) under a single command (Riley, 2008). Top Navy officials understood that 
each stakeholder had different interests, different expectations as to the results of the 
project, and different definitions of when the project would be deemed successful. So to 
facilitate a smooth transition to NGEN from NMCI with no loss of services to end users, 
Navy officials provided a medium through NGEN SPO to voice and foster a new level of 
coordination between all stakeholders in the implementation of the NGEN initiative. 
                                                 
20 The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) is the primary regulation for use by all Federal 
Executive agencies in their acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated funds. It became effective 
on April 1, 1984, and is issued within applicable laws under the joint authorities of the Administrator of 
General Services, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator for the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, under the broad policy guidelines of the Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy, Office of Management and Budget. 
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b. Weaknesses 
The challenge with stakeholder expectations is the disparity in 
expectations, and the more stakeholders in a complex environment such as the DoD, the 
greater the existence of multiple environmental elements with diverse intentions, 
demands, and expectations (Hannon, 2004). A medium to facilitate total stakeholder 
disclosure and subsequent negotiation of the diverse stakeholder expectations should be 
the norm and not the exception, but often, as seen in implementation with NMCI, such a 
medium was nonexistent. The absence of open communication to collaborate and discuss 
expectations by the relevant stakeholders creates void or false expectations, which results 
in disillusionment and a decrease in the credibility of the project (Taylor, 2006). The lack 
of communication is not always the cause of the stakeholder interaction, but sometimes it 
is the effect of the interaction. A recent hearing before Congress concerning challenges to 
vendors doing business with the DoD, revealed the trend of more vendors being unaware 
of what their clients might need and an increased reluctance to share their ideas. The 
reluctance stems from concern that ideas discussed will be compromised because the 
vendors might no longer have the differentiator that wins the next award (U.S. House, 
2010). 
The lack of disclosure in stakeholder communication can lead to false 
expectations and a decrease in the credibility of the project; conversely, taking into 
consideration the different criteria of satisfaction and viewing each as a goal to be met 
can lead to a compromised end product. Shillabeer, Buss, & Rousseau (2011) claim the 
nature of the process of negotiating is inherently flawed because it ensures the end 
product is unlikely to fulfill every stakeholder’s expectation.  
The GAO report (2006) claimed that after six years and $3.7 billion, the 
NMCI program had not met the expectations of the intranet. GAO cited the failure to 
achieve information superiority and collaboration through interoperability and shared 
services as a blatant departure from the stated strategic goals of the intranet. It further 
attributed this deficiency to Navy leadership’s failure to implement a viable plan to 
monitor how these goals were being met. The failure was as a result of the desultory 
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planning that plagued the intranet from its inception, but it was also a result of fallacious 
expectations by the stakeholders, leading to a compromised end product. 
Congress has expectations that all MAIS
21
 procurements by the DoD 
would be facilitated through the established acquisition procedures and without deviation 
from the law except with proper authorization. Consequently, as Navy officials attempted 
to bypass the traditional procurement process by labeling NMCI as a “service” and not a 
“system,” Congress became militant toward every initiative with the nascent intranet and 
almost eliminated the program altogether (Taylor, 2006). Navy officials also suffered 
disillusionment in regards to expectations for NMCI as the projected pace of 
implementation continued to slow down. The impediment was due to a halfhearted 
accounting of legacy systems and subsequent software compatibility problems with the 
newly installed NMCI machines. Navy leadership expected due diligence in the 
accounting of the disparate systems by Echelon II commands; they also expected the 
same commanders to communicate the urgency of the network, but were disappointed on 
both accounts. 
EDS received the direct consequences of failed expectations. By early 
2003, EDS had invested nearly $2 billion in the project with the intent to recoup any 
losses further down range when the capital costs were minimal. This plan was thwarted 
due to the lengthy delays caused by the legacy application problem, and the slower-than-
planned seat delivery rate greatly affected its NMCI business model and would cost EDS 
$3 billion. The end users for whom the system was designed never had any input. Taylor 
(2006) argues that the most important stakeholders in the NMCI program were the end 
users, but they were never involved in the decision-making, so there was no buy-in. The 
end users in general appeared to be ill informed about what it would take to be part of the 
NMCI enterprise and this ignorance caused the end users to be either apathetic or 
blatantly resistant. The apathy manifested in the benign forms of frustration, but the more 
                                                 
21 Designation for all systems of computer hardware, computer software, data and/or 
telecommunications that perform functions such as collecting, processing, storing, transmitting and 
displaying information, which exceed $378 million (FY 2000 constant dollars) for all expenditures, for all 
increments, regardless of appropriation or fund source, directly related to the AIS definition, design, 
development, deployment, operations and maintenance, and incurred from the beginning of the MSA phase 
through sustainment for the estimated useful life of the system 
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adept user with “autonomous” control of a legacy system(s) would experience a rude 
awakening when transitioning from localized control to a high degree of centralized 
control and operation. The belligerent end user would often make deliberate attempts to 
antagonize EDS’s efforts during local installation. 
The expectation for NMCI was highly ambitious at best and not shared by 
all the stakeholders. The expectation of what NMCI could be and what it would provide 
generated anticipation and promise, but the mismanagement of this expectation and the 
consequent friction it generated led to lost time, capability, and money. To the credit of 
all the stakeholders, there were always attempts to salvage NMCI and steer it back on 
track, but the end product fell short of the initial design. Gutierrez & Friedman (2005) see 
the process of realignment and redesign as a way to compensate for certain elements of a 
project considered to be the cause of a current and less desirable state, but often the 
compensatory action just does enough to satisfy the basics of the original requirements. 
Figure 11 shows the cascading nature of expectations and the stages that the stakeholders 
experience after realizing that the gap between the vision and the current reality is greater 
than anticipated. 
 
Figure 7.  Project Management Cycle (From Gutierrez & Friedman, 2005). 
Peter Senge, in the fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning 
organization, claims that there two ways to respond to a gap between the current state 
and the vision. The first is known as a “fundamental solution” which takes proactive 
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action to bring reality in line with the vision; the second is the “symptomatic solution” 
which seeks to lower the vision to bring it in line with the current reality (p.152). The 
Navy’s vision for NMCI was to consolidate the 1,000 diverse legacy systems and shore-
based networks (all operated and maintained by separate organizations and vulnerable to 
intruders). The NMCI benchmark envisioned by the Navy leadership promised rapid and 
seamless communication, collaboration, and data exchange with anyone on the network, 
but the implementation of the intranet would confirm the words of German military 
strategist Helmuth von Moltke, “No plan survives contact with the enemy” (Two guys 
meet, 2013). The enemy would include haphazard accounting of legacy systems, 
incompatibility of software, end user resistance, and hostility from Congress. The 
consequent disillusionment and attempt at realignment would force the Navy to lessen its 
vision to keep the contractor “well” by contract extensions and a reduction of the number 
of SLAs used to evaluate performance, and the decision to begin paying for legacy 
system support (Taylor, 2006) 
Today, NMCI provides about 382,000 workstations to approximately 
700,000 users across 2,500 Navy and marine corps locations around the world, 
facilitating the transfer of over 3.5 terabytes of data while denying in excess of 2 million 
unauthorized access attempts and disinfecting tens of thousands of viruses (DoD, 2009; 
GAO, 2011). The capability of NMCI today is adequate to satisfy the core of the original 
requirements, but the reality is that the current environment is a compromise of what it 
could have been. With costs to run the NMCI network at about $1.2 billion a year, in 
addition to the $1.5 billion required to run the legacy networks (permitted to continue 
operations as “excepted” networks, albeit with a lack of the much needed interoperability 
and standardization), it seems the Navy leadership settled with the same problem it had in 
the beginning (Taylor, 2008). 
c. Opportunities 
One of the ETAs being used to facilitate the smooth transition from NMCI 
to NGEN is the Global NetOps command and control Workforce Establishment (ETA 
1C). NGEN requirements document (2008a) identified a gap in the number of personnel 
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with the degree of competency in technical and process maturity capability required for 
the daily operations of NGEN. The ETA will ensure the government is ready to assume 
oversight in a government-owned and networked environment, given its size and 
complexity. ETA 1C provides enterprise-wide position descriptions and occupational 
standards for standardized training, advancement criteria, and performance objectives 
based on DoDD 8570.01M, the premier document for guidance on DoD information 
assurance training, certification, and workforce management.  
DoDD 8570.1M (2007) identifies and categorizes positions and 
certification of personnel conducting IA functions within the DoD workforce supporting 
the DoD GIG in accordance with overarching DoD directives.
22
 The requirement for an 
adequate workforce began as a phased approach in 2005, and after its fourth year it 
mandates that all IT initiatives must be in 100% compliance with 8570.1M, further 
specifying that the Department of Defense requires approximately 110,000 identified IA 
professionals to be certified. In order to assure that the NGEN Workforce is DoD 8570 1 
compliant, DON leadership plans to conduct a job task analysis and assess learning tools 
for contractor technical representatives to develop enterprise-wide position descriptions 
and occupational standards for training, advancement, criteria, and performance 
objectives (GAO, 2011). 
Though this ETA is essential to develop standards for training, 
advancement, criteria, and performance objectives, it does little to address the dynamic of 
the stakeholders’ expectations in light of the seemingly increasing complexity of NGEN. 
The Navy leadership needs to ensure all relevant stakeholders have a grasp on what is 
expected.  
(1) Share the Vision 
With the influx of over 100,000 professionals identified by the 
DoD for IA purposes, DoD is in the prime position to imbue its nascent members with a 
consolidated strategic vision of the net-centric environment it strives for. The opportunity 
to leverage lessons learned from the consolidation of the disparate networks is 
                                                 
22 DoD Directive DoDD8000.1, “Management of DoD Information Resources and Information 
Technology,” February 27, 2002 and DoD Directive 8500.1, “Information Assurance,” October 24, 2002 
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immeasurable, considering the many missteps that plagued the NMCI project. With 
NMCI, Taylor (2006) acknowledges the existence of a vision for the intranet, but 
contends the vision was not accepted by the organization because the main stakeholders, 
including Congress, the Navy’s executives, and most importantly, the end users, did not 
fully understand why NMCI was important and why it needed to be implemented as soon 
as possible (pp. 8283). Brynjolfsson, Renshaw, & Alstyne, (1997) discovered from a 
survey a high variance in stakeholder priorities, and they attribute the variance to a 
fragmented vision. Brynjolfsson et al. further contend stakeholders with different 
priorities will tend to work at cross-purposes during implementation, and the act of 
genuinely soliciting input gives stakeholders a sense of ownership and responsibility, 
which has a positive effect on the change process. 
The idea of having “all” stakeholders’ inputs not only ensures a 
buy-in to the idea for all parties concerned, but it also ensures that the vision is shared. 
Westley & Mintzberg (1989) claim that a “vision comes alive only when it is shared” 
because the dynamic relationship rather than the unidirectional norm, is the key to 
motivating people to coalesce and realize a desired vision. A dynamic and reciprocal 
relationship is feasible in most employment environments because of informal, less-
structured leader-follower arrangements, but for organizations that require a stark 
distinction between leaders and followers, such as the military, the unidirectional vision 
from the top down is a staple (Gardner, 1987, p. 187). Taylor (2006) highlights the overt 
decision to exclude Congress and the failure to include the end user in the 
implementation of NMCI as a critical failure on the part of the Navy leadership. Goss, 
Pascale & Athos (1998) echo the sentiment because the end users have strength in 
numbers; therefore, for a transformation effort to be successful, it 
…must encompass a critical mass of stakeholders – the employees “who 
really make things happen around here.” Some hold sway over key 
resources. Others are central to informal opinion networks. The group may 
often include critical but seldom seen people like key technologists and 
leading process engineers. The goal is a flywheel effect, where enough 
key players get involved and enrolled that it creates momentum to carry 
the process forward. (Goss et al., p. 102) 
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The vision from the Navy leaders had to be shared by all the 
stakeholders because a shared concept becomes a “shared covenant that bonds together 
leader and follower in a moral commitment” (Sergiovanni, 1990). Murphy (1988) further 
stresses the importance of a shared vision because it “is rare to see a clearly defined 
vision articulated by a leader at the top of the hierarchy and then installed by followers”. 
Sharing the vision is exceedingly difficult to implement across the entire breadth of an 
organization such as the military due to the sheer size and the complexity of the 
organization’s daily operations. This difficulty lends to the argument against a shared 
vision, the essence of collaboration, which often can be lethargic and a singular 
impediment to urgent needs for change or demands for quick action. The negatives to not 
sharing a vision with every stakeholder can also be detrimental to the process as 
evidenced in the pitfalls of NMCI implementation. Navy and Marine Corps leaders made 
the right step with the formation of NGEN SPO working groups (Riley, 2008). Instead of 
disestablishing the NGEN SPO, it should be continued and be all-inclusive of all the 
stakeholders especially as the segmented network will be supplied by multiple vendors. 
d. Threats 
Many threats that still loom over the implementation of NGEN are 
residual from the efforts of implementing NMCI, but most of the threats are unique to the 
NGEN experience. The GAO (2011) report claims the acquisition approach that DON 
intended for the implementation of NGEN was not one of the alternatives assessed in the 
analysis, and it was potentially riskier and costlier than the other alternatives analyzed 
because of the higher number of contractual relationships (GAO, 2011, p1). As the 
discussed in earlier chapters, DON officials contend the segmented approach was 
selected because of the increased flexibility in meeting NGEN capabilities and goals with 
lower costs than NMCI. This segmentation extends to the management domains of the 
network, where the USN will operate its own domain as a government-owned contractor-
operated network while the Marine Corps will operate, as a government-owned 
government-operated network. The Marine Corps will primarily act as its own service 
provider with supplemental contractor support as needed. The different operational  
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models are intended to allow the USN and Marine Corps to operate their respective 
domains in the manner best suited to support their different mission needs (GAO, 2012, 
p. 4). 
The risk of segmentation as identified by the GAO (2011) report is the 
increase in the number of contractual relationships required to effectively implement and 
operate NGEN. The risk of the increase in contractual relationships is further 
compounded by the apparent lack of a plan for DON to facilitate coordination among 
contractors and the government in operating NGEN (GAO, 2012, 21). The threat of 
adding more contractual relationships to an already complex environment is that 
environmental diversity increases as the number of spheres of influence 
increases. A diverse environment may cause the work on one product to 
hinder the work on other products; services rendered to one type of 
customer may detract from the services provided to other types of 
customers. Organizational managers must be aware of their organization’s 
environmental diversity. (Hannon, 2004, p. 18) 
This diverse environment has seen focus on one product hinder the work 
on other products as more effort and focus was directed to additional planning before 
issuing the transport and enterprise services request for proposals and addressing industry 
comments on the draft request for proposals to prevent bid protests further down range 
(GAO, 2012, 18). This further planning consequently compressed the timeline and 
exacerbated the risks with NGEN implementation to include “potential delays in 
transition from the incumbent to the new service provider(s) and in contract award for the 
transport and enterprise services, as well as the potential lack of coordination among 
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Table 2. NGEN Program Critical Risks, as of July 2012 (After GAO 2012a) 
Program identified 
critical risk 
Program risk description from 
program documentation 
Program identified risk level 
Seam management Roles and relationships among 
segments and government functions 
have not been defined or agreed on. If 
these seams are not accurately 
identified and characterized, DON will 
not be able to manage them effectively 
and the transition will take longer. 
High 
 
The GAO has made the point repeatedly of DON officials not doing a 
thorough and effective AoA, but DON officials have stayed the course and still plan to 
pursue the segmented approach amidst the ambiguity of touted flexibility using the 
chosen alternatives (GAO, 2011, p19). DON officials have deferred to the ETAs as 
adequate measures to establish government management capabilities, which will facilitate 
collaboration and accelerate the transition time (GAO, 2012, p12). The efficacy of the 
network depends greatly on the ability of DON to manage the relationship between 
different contractors and government elements. DON also has to ensure that the 
components that make up segments (an allocation of IT services, functions, tools, and 
roles and responsibilities associated with end-to-end service delivery) are compatible 
(GAO, 2012). 
2. Requirements 
Defining requirements for an information technology project is an extremely 
important, if not the most important, element for any successful project. Because IT 
projects are inherently complex, implementations require a meticulous requirements’ 
definition process that stems from a shared vision. The shared vision refers to one that is 
built by all stakeholders and captures all relevant processes and activities. If the 
requirements are not clearly stated upfront, complexity is adversely affected and can 
exponentially increase the scope, cost, and the time of the overall project. The issue with 
requirements can be as basic as insufficient information from the customer, unrealistic 
expectations upfront, or a stated requirement that fails to meet the desired project 
objectives. Insufficient information is often a result of the ignorance of the customer, for 
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example, the unknown unknowns,
23
 and ignorance of the customer is usually a byproduct 
of taking on novel projects with immature systems or components. Being ignorant of the 
unknowns also negates the ability to plan and provide adequate contingencies against 
future risks. If there is a requirement deficiency, especially in the analysis phase, it will 
almost always lead to cost and schedule overruns in information system projects (Shand, 
1994; Engming and Hsieh, 1994). 
The federal government recognizes the negative impacts of not addressing its IT 
issue concerning requirements, and to that end has made great strides to mitigate the 
risks. The federal government, with the help of industry leaders, has collaborated to 
establish policy along with appropriate governance to ensure the effective application and 
evolution of IT. Certain policies have had positive results, while others, such as the 
LPTA mandate, have further hampered the issue with requirements. The dependence of 
the federal government will continue, but so will the complexity of the new 
interconnected global environment, and due diligence has to be given to the criticality of 
information technology.  
a. Strengths 
In a direct response to the findings of a congressional inquiry into the lack 
of proper management and oversight of IT in the federal agencies, Congress passed the 
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (Gillam, 2010). The reform 
act, later renamed the Clinger-Cohen Act after Rep. William Clinger and Sen. William 
Cohen who pushed the legislation through, would attempt to curb the numerous IT issues 
with acquisition regulations and IT management in the federal government. The Act 
realigned responsibility of agencies involved in the procurement of federal government 
                                                 
23 United States secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, during a DoD news briefing concerning 
issues with Iraq stated, “There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there 
are known unknowns; that is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
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IT equipment and systems and established the position of CIO. Table 3 gives a summary 
of changes made by passing the CCA. 
Table 3. Summary of Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Title 40 from National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (After Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996). 
The law gives Office of Management Budget (OMB) responsibility for:  
 Developing a process for analyzing, tracking, and evaluating the risks and results of major capital 
investments 
 Directing executive agencies on establishing an effective, efficient IT capital planning and 
investment review process, and enforcing accountability through the budget process.  
The law gives executive agencies responsibility for:  
 Establishing an IT capital planning and investment review process 
 Using performance measures to assess how well IT supports programs 
 Justifying continuation of systems that deviate from cost, performance, or schedule goals 
The Clinger-Cohen Act establishes a Chief information officer (CIO) in executive agencies who:  
 Reports directly to the agency head 
  Has Information Resources Management (IRM) as the primary duty 
 Provides advice and assistance to the agency head on IT and information resources management 
 Develops an integrated IT architecture 
 Promotes efficient and effective design and operation of IRM processes 
 Uses performance measures to monitor IT programs 
 Assesses the knowledge and skills of IRM personnel 
 Shares with the CFO responsibility for provision of financial and performance data for financial 
statements 
 Assumes the responsibilities of the Designated Senior Official defined in Paperwork Reduction 
Act 
 
The CCA also provides guidance on the minimum required standards 
necessary for the effective operations or security of federal information systems and 
requires that federal agencies to use a disciplined capital planning and investment control 
(CPIC) process to acquire, use, maintain, and dispose of information technology (NIST, 
2009). The CPIC process ensures all federal government investments in IT are made by 
integrating, budget, financial, and program management decisions to fulfill its missions 
and business needs. The CPIC accomplishes these requirements through three distinct 
phases (see Figure 8): select, control, and evaluate. The CPIC process is intended to be 
recursive and is essential to ensure that IT investments are effective. The recursive nature 
of the CPIC process allows evaluations (on quantifiable measurements) to be used to 
assess the risk and benefits of current investment issues, which provides senior 
management with concurrent information in regard to cost, timeliness, and quality. 
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Figure 8.  CPIC Process (From NIST, 2009, p.9) 
The federal government also uses IT acquisition best practices utilized by 
private industries. Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute
24
 is one such industry 
that has established highly regarded and widely used guidance used by the federal 
government. The institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Development 
aids the requirement creation process by initiating and managing products and services 
that include all supplier and acquirer activity. The model also seeks to eliminate some 
barriers by using common language to aid in requirements development and 
management, risk management, configuration management, validation and verification, 
and project monitoring and control. 
                                                 
24 The Carnegie Melon Software Engineering Institute works closely with DoD and other 
government organizations, continually improving software with the goal of improving software engineering 
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GAO’s own research in IT management best practices and knowledge 
gleaned from past experiences with implementation of IT in the federal government led 
to the development of the Information Technology Investment Management Framework 
(GAO, 2011b). This framework was developed using the select/control/evaluate approach 
from the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (see Table 3). The management framework also 
stresses critical oversight of system development and acquisition management, and 
organizes past performances and experiences into a set of critical processes for successful 
investments.  
The federal government recognizes that IT is a critical resource and has 
thus spearheaded numerous regulations and directives along with appropriate governance 
to ensure the effective application and evolution of IT. The dependence of the federal 
government on IT will only continue to grow as more of its functions become automated 
and digitized to improve performance.  
b. Weaknesses 
GAO report (2011) contend one of the main weaknesses facing federal IT 
investments is requirements management because of its negative impact, such as cost 
increases and schedule delays, and in worst case, cancellation or significant restructuring 
(p.5). In regard to the implementation of NMCI, Jordan et al (2007) study revealed that 
DON did not define all of its technical requirements when it solicited contractor bids, and 
many of the critical technical requirements were not dealt with until after contract award. 
The most important failure for the lack of substantive requirement definitions would be 
the upgrade of legacy applications to meet the requirements for inclusion in NMCI. The 
flawed requirements management stemmed from the inception of the intranet idea 
because DON leadership had failed to develop a formal analysis of program alternatives 
and complete a business case analysis to determine an appropriate acquisition strategy for 
the proposed intranet. The AoA ensures the system or components being procured have 
been verified and validated through stringent MOE, cost, schedule, concepts of 
operations, and overall risk assessment. More importantly, the sensitivity of each 
alternative to possible changes in key assumptions or variables is determined.  
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The verification of the system answers the question, “Are we building the 
product right?” while validation testing answers the question, “Are we building the right 
product?” Properly performing an AoA can aid in ensuring that requirements are 
carefully developed and reliability guaranteed for the end product. Conversely, not 
following established procedures such as the AoA could affect a project negatively. For 
example, with NMCI the Navy leaders found that the number of legacy applications had 
substantially been underestimated, and this underestimation contributed to the transition 
period slipping from 2½ years to 3½ years (GAO, 2003). The GAO (2003) report claims 
the Navy and the Marine Corps did not perform a thorough analysis but instead 
performed an analysis at remote locations to obtain a baseline. This baseline did not 
include an assessment of the DON’s legacy applications since project officials decided to 
rely on outdated inventories (p. 36). The weakness described is clearly one of neglecting 
set directives designed to safeguard against the malfeasance of senior officials, but other 
issues are simply a consequence of the complexity of the federal government IT 
implementation. 
Some weaknesses in developing requirements are due to imposed 
legislation, as was the case with NMCI where Navy leadership claimed that delays with 
implementation was due to the onerous certification and accreditation requirements for 
all applications and legislation requiring certain analyses to be completed before seat 
deployment could exceed specific levels. With NMCI, the requirements came in the form 
of SLAs laden with complex criteria, which ended up as a financial burden for EDS 
(Jordan 2007). Many contractors experience the dynamic nature of requirements, 
especially during the course of a solicitation where federal agencies such as the DoD will 
often change the requirements with very little time for contractors to respond (U.S. 
House, 2012). 
These changes to requirements are usually a consequence of the lack of a 
thorough AoA at the genesis of a project, but can cause widespread reworking and 
rebaselining. Rebaselining is the issuing of a new revised baseline, estimate, and schedule 
because of new complexities and findings with a project; the “symptomatic solution” 
which seeks to lower the vision to bring it in line with the current reality. GAO officials 
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reported that the key reasons for the most recent rebaselinings in government IT projects 
were changes in project requirements, objectives, or scope, and changes in funding 
stream. Table 4 shows the estimated frequencies of each of these reasons.  
Table 4. Estimated Frequency of Reasons for the Most Recent Rebaselining of 
Projects Category of Reasons (After GAO 2008b) 
Category of Reasons for the Most Recent Rebaselining 
of Projects  
Percentage of times reported 
Change in project requirements, objectives, or scope 
Change in funding stream 
Original baseline was inaccurate 
Cost or schedule overruns due to project performance 









The changes are usually in response to an unexpected challenge and can 
be virtually non-ending. According to a study by Baccarini et al. (2004), the stakeholders’ 
continuous changes to requirements are one of the highly ranked risks throughout the 
project lifecycle. The non-ending changes can also be attributed to the “cascading need 
effect,” which is a byproduct of acquisitions of new information systems technology 
because it often leads to the acquisition of other support systems or the addition of 
unexpected tasks. This unexpected need or dependence on new information technology 
can cause an exponential increase to the overall cost and schedule (Benamati, Lederer, & 
Singh, 1998).  
Until the relevant stakeholders have a comprehensive dialogue that fields input 
from all concerned, it will be difficult to have requirements that are sound and stable. 
Suppliers must fully understand what the customer wants so that limited research and 
development resources are invested effectively. The customer also has to involve all its 
stakeholders and leverage subject matter experts from industry to avoid pitfalls with 
requirement development. Without a comprehensive overhaul of the way requirements 
are developed, the result will be “overreach” on requirements, and an increase of cost, 
schedule, and performance problems in acquisition programs.  
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c. Opportunities 
In the past, the federal government has leveraged the economies of scale 
and benefitted from the cost savings of large purchases, but when applied to IT systems 
the model is flawed. Economies of scale translate to acquiring system of systems, which 
can solve all problems, even those that are unknown. This approach is intrinsically 
flawed due to the complexity of IT and further exacerbated by the attempt to do too much 
at once given the complexity of the federal government. In the recent 25-point 
implementation plan to reform federal information technology management, the U.S. 
CIO, Vivek Kundra, lamented on the dire state of information technology in the federal 
government. Kundra (2010) claims the federal government has spent over $600 billion on 
IT projects but has failed to deliver promised functionality because of its “grand design” 
approaches that deliver functionality every few years, rather than breaking projects into 
more manageable chunks and demanding new functionality every few quarters.  
The idea of implementing IT in smaller “manageable chunks” refers to the 
method of building systems using an agile or modular development process. This process 
leverages an incremental, recursive, and collaborative process that is exhaustive and 
inclusive of all stakeholders. The idea is that instead of spending hundreds of millions of 
dollars on a mammoth system using a waterfall
25
 approach, it might be better to break 
projects up into smaller elements with each element completely “certified” before 
advancing the project. One advantage of developing requirements with the agile/modular 
method is that it requires a greater cooperation and interaction amongst the relevant 
stakeholders. The service oriented architecture (SOA) 2008 working group, in a 
recommendation to DoD for acquisition of information services, suggested the agile and 
modular method to help the government rebalance the contractor SLAs because of the 
lack of interdependency not seen in the current environment (p. vi). 
                                                 
25 The waterfall development model originates in the manufacturing and construction industries, 
highly structured physical environments in which after-the-fact changes are prohibitively costly, if not 
impossible. Since no formal software development methodologies existed at the time, this hardware-
oriented model was simply adapted for software development. Retrieved from 
http://sunset.usc.edu/csse/TECHRPTS/1983/usccse83–501/usccse83–501.pdf 
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The benefits of the modular development are not a novel concept for the 
federal government and have been recommended in the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and the CCA of 1996. CCA recommends that “head(s) of an executive agency 
should, to the maximum extent practicable, use modular contracting for an acquisition of 
a major system of information technology” (Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 § 5202). The 
FAR also endorses the use of modular development to reduce overall project risk and 
meet the federal government’s need for timely access to rapidly changing technology. 
The question posed here is, “Why has the government not mandated the use of modular 
development in all of its IT implementation?” Or an even more pertinent question, “How 
can we verify that agencies are using modular development in IT implementation?” 
Though there is no one an answer to the questions, but the solution lies in a collective 
willingness to change the existing culture and leverage the available opportunities. Only 
then can the federal government avert the crisis of technology obsolescence. 
The GAO Report (2011) Better Informed Decision Making Needed on 
Navy’s Next Generation Enterprise Network Acquisition claimed NGEN capabilities, 
such as secure transport of voice and data, data storage, and e-mail, were to be 
incrementally acquired through multiple providers. The report, however, found though 
the first increment has been planned and budgeted for, future increments were yet to be 
defined. The report’s further analysis used in determination of the increments was not 
reliable due to erroneous estimating methodology, rationale, and indiscernible results of a 
risk analysis (p. 12). 
The complexity facing federal IT is critical, and the leadership must act 
now to mandate the use of modular development in all aspects of IT implementation and 
acquisition. Leveraging modular development and dividing IT investments into 
manageable elements has to permeate all relevant parties of the process. Modular 
methodology will ensure the project is verified and validated often in order to curb risks, 
while delivering much-needed capabilities faster. This methodology will prevent the 
federal government from fading into technological obsolescence, and, more importantly, 
allow for an all-encompassing effort in requirement development. The only caveat is that 
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though it promises delivered functionality in shorter timeframes, is not one-size-fits-all 
and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  
d. Threats 
GAO report (2012a) states that the entire NGEN program is currently 
plagued by a lack of defined requirements, time constraints, and inadequate analysis of 
alternatives, but it has been approved at a key acquisition reviews. The report also 
attributed the several billions added to the estimated cost at completion to risks identified 
in the past, which have now materialized into critical issues and stagnated the transition 
efforts. The issues with NGEN appear to be self-inflicted due to the desultory AoA done 
prior to the transition from NMCI, and these threats will continue with the choices DON 
leadership intends to follow through with. 
One of the choices being made could result in an increase in the number of 
contractors and stakeholders, and its impact has been discussed as it pertains to 
stakeholder relationships. The increase in contractors has been lauded as a system to 
increase competition and decrease price, but it has raised new challenges in the area of 
collaboration. How will prospective contractors coordinate their various requirements for 
their segments? Are there any additional requirements for interoperability or security 
between the segments? The unknown elements associated with segmentation and the 
level of interoperability poses a clear and present danger, not only to the NGEN transition 
initiative, but also to the efficacy of organic net-centric warfare capabilities. 
Another looming threat to requirements is cost. Threat of cost is 
precarious because on one hand the DON officials are trying to procure NGEN at the 
LPTA while abdicating the responsibility of doing a thorough assessment on alternatives. 
On the other hand, the vendors are trying to no avail to balance a triad of cost, quality, 
and profit. The idea of the LPTA process is appropriate when best value is expected a 
priori from a selection of technically acceptable proposals. The ideal, however, has not 
translated into practice and has served as an impediment to effective development of 
requirements and adoption of technology because it forces behavior that pretermits 
superior products to save on the price (U.S. House, 2011). 
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With cost as a driver for requirements, the federal government has painted 
itself into a corner and ensured that it is isolated from the best technology available. In 
his testimony before Congress, Hodgkins III, senior vice president for national security 
and procurement policy, TechAmerica, asserted his belief that the LPTA had nurtured an 
environment that deterred the pursuit of the best ideas and genuine innovation but 
encouraged competition that is based on the lowest offer from vendors that have met the 
minimum technological requirement (U.S. House, 2011). 
For vendors that do meet the minimum technology requirement, small 
businesses are marginalized because they often “cannot achieve economic order 
quantities to reduce unit costs the way large companies can” ((U.S. House, 2012). To 
potentially repress the contribution of small businesses results in lost innovation and 
agility, and detracts from the idea of preserving a free competitive enterprise. The LPTA 
has evolved to value low price considerations over quality, so government personnel can 
expect inferior end products as the norm rather than the exception. 
3. Management  
There is no substitute for effective use of resources and time especially in large 
projects.  Good management is indispensible at every level of organization, from garage 
start-ups to global conglomerates. The complexity of today’s organizational climate 
commands that managers not only solve problems as they arise, but must also be 
proactive and prevent problems. This concept applies to project management where the 
manager is responsible for the planning, budgeting, execution, and closing. For each 
project, the number of interdependent elements varies and has to be identified and 
analyzed, a task not easily achieved in even the simplest of projects. Interdependencies 
can cause overt or covert disruptions that if not checked can cause major projects to fail.  
Failure of major IT projects is the norm rather than the exception, and poor 
management is one of the main causes. Though a main cause for IT failure, the point of 
single-point accountability is moot when referring to colossal and complex systems such 
as NMCI and NGEN. In most large and complex organizations, the difficulties in 
managing any transformation are greatly increased and some experts agree that poor 
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management of IT projects is the key contributor to incomplete or otherwise unsuccessful 
IT implementations (Gibson, 2003).  
For successful IT implementation, a management cadre must receive the right 
support from the leadership, be competent for the level of responsibility assigned, and 
prioritize the requirements by understanding the present state and the desired end state of 
the project. Beckhard & Harris (1987) claim that not understanding the desired end state 
is the most significant threat to successful change management because its emphasis is on 
the desired termination point. Anderson & Anderson (2001) claim a clear and definitive 
goal or end state guides leaders to a planning process with greater certainty on how to get 
there, though the process can be challenging because of unforeseen complications and 
burdens. This challenge was clearly the evident during the installation of the new and 
centralized NMCI network, which was burdened with the extra task of migrating and 
merging the indispensable legacy systems (Taylor, 2006).  
Understanding the present state in the case on NMCI was difficult because, 
according to the GAO report (2011a), the current state of NMCI before the decision to 
move to NGEN was not available or easily verifiable since the data was proprietary to the 
contractor. Without a proper analysis of the current state of NMCI, officials at the GAO 
have asked Congress to stop progress on NGEN. DON officials refute GAO’s claim and 
assert that several ETAs will facilitate a seamless transition between NMCI and NGEN 
and be sufficient to mitigate all risk. The ETAs have since been deemed ineffective in the 
GAO report (2011a) citing DON’s failure to conduct an accurate analysis of alternatives 
in the acquisition process, leaving decision makers without assurance that their selected 
approach is the most promising and cost-effective course of action.  
Managing IT, either as a project such as a transition and implementation or as the 
daily maintenance and sustaining of a complex network, requires a high level of agility 
and competence from relevant managers. Managers must possess a comprehensive 
knowledge base augmented with vigorous training to effectively manage and balance the 
cost, performance, and schedule to ensure the government has the best bang for its buck. 
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a. Strengths 
As discussed in previous sections, the government has a rigid hierarchical 
structure that has been essential to the common defense of the homeland. Also intrinsic to 
this environment is highly structured standards of operation. With the acquisition and 
implementation of MAIS, the management is governed by the MAIS acquisition 
lifecycle. The current MAIS acquisition lifecycle is derived from the five phases of the 
acquisition life cycle:  
 Materiel Solution Analysis  
 Technology Development  
 Engineering and Manufacturing Development  
 Production and Deployment  
 Operations and Support  
Though a very restricted sequence, program managers are expected to streamline this 
model to the maximum extent possible, consistent with technical risk, to provide new 
systems to the warfighter as quickly as possible (DAU, n.d.) 
The management of MAIS in the DoD starts during the concept 
refinement portion of the pre-acquisitions phase with the charter of program managers 
(PM) and integrated project team (IPT). The program manager and IPT charter sets the 
tone on how the program will be managed. It identifies the roles (for government 
personnel and contractors) and responsibilities, and assigns liability to relevant 
stakeholders. With the designation of the PM and IPT, the team is expected to perform a 
comprehensive AoA, create am information assurance plan, and provide the first of three 
Clinger-Cohen compliance reports (see Table 3 for summary of the CCA of 1996). With 
a successful Milestone
26
 review, the program can exit the pre-acquisition phase and enter 
the technology development phase. 
The development phase is based on validation of the interoperability and 
supportability of the system being developed. The Levels of Information Systems 
                                                 
26 All milestone reviews are by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Investment Review 
Board (IRB), certified by the designated approval authority. The Defense Business System Management 
Committee (DBSMC) must approve the certification before any funds for modernization can be obligated. 
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Interoperability checklist guides the management through the development phase by 
identifying the different levels of complexity necessary for system-to-system information 
exchanges and provides a common DoD basis for requirements definition and for system 
improvements (DoD, 1998). In this phase the PM and IPT are required to develop the 
configuration management plans, the cost analysis requirements document, and the 
acquisition program baseline, and conduct the second Clinger-Cohen compliance report. 
Following a successful second milestone review, the program is allowed to exit the 
current phase and enter the following phase. 
This activity continues for another three or four phases and involves the 
PM and IPT in a rigorous system requirement analysis, a software requirement analysis, 
an IA validation, system performance measurements and a Clinger-Cohen compliance 
report before the program is subjected to a milestone review. The management of the 
MAIS life cycle culminates in the full rate production and deployment, where 
management shifts from the sequential phases to operation performance oversight, 
punctuated with annual security reviews and tests.  
The MAIS life cycle is a highly structured guideline for the PM and IPT to 
navigate the complex and length acquisition cycle of information systems. The strength 
of the MAIS lifecycle is the systematic flow of development and the consequent 
assessments by multidisciplinary groups such as the Investment Review Board and the 
Defense Business System Management Committee. These assessments allow for different 
perspectives on the same process and aid in detecting deficiencies that might be 
overlooked by a more homogeneous group. 
b. Weaknesses 
In the Challenges to Doing Business with the Department of Defense 
(2012), the high rate of personnel turnover of government acquisition personnel was seen 
as a management problem that led to failures in IT acquisition. The transient nature of 
DoD personnel due to the frequent PCSes pervades all areas of DoD, to include the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). The immediate consequence for an agency 
such as the DCAA is a break in continuity and consistency with regard to the application 
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of acquisition policy. The report asserts the long-term implications appear even direr as a 
DCAA becomes more under-resourced and lacks trained, skilled personnel, hampering 
the ability of these agencies to provide appropriate contract oversight and management 
(p. Vii). The lack of skilled personnel, especially in the field of IT, in the government can 
be attributed to the long-held misconception by DoD leadership that employment of 
industry experts to manage the information systems would free warfighters to concentrate 
more on fighting wars (Taylor, 2006). This issue with management is not unique to the 
DoD organization as “many organizations are flat and lean, with many competencies 
outsourced, so it is not unexpected that personnel shortfalls are the highest ranked risk” 
(Baccarini et al., 2004, p. 290). In Challenges to doing business with the Department of 
Defense (2012), it was noted that DoD’s reliance on private contractors could lead to a 
conflict of interest and blur the lines between work that must be done in-house and what 
work is permitted to be performed by private contractors (p. vi). Furthermore, with the 
NGEN transition, the issue of insufficient skilled personnel attributed to DON’s failure to 
establish the sequence of activities with direct impact to the planned completion date of 
the transition to NGEN (GAO, 2012a, p. 9). 
Other management weaknesses prevalent in the DoD have to do with its 
Command and Control management style. C2 in its simplest form is the unidirectional 
exercise of authority by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached 
forces in the accomplishment of the mission. This typical centralized command structure 
(depicted in Figure 13) affords its subordinates minimal feedback on how strategy is 
created by placing an emphasis on output over outcome (Shane, 2010, p. 11). Taylor 
(2006) describes the Navy’s traditional strategy for introducing change as a “fast 
implementation with minimal communication and the end-user has no choice but to 
accept the change and move on” (p.111). 
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Figure 9.  A Typical View of Command and Control—Command and Control Seen as 
Unidirectional (After MCDP 6, 1996) 
Though the end user was forced to accept the changes, the “feedback” 
system in place was flawed. GAO (2006) report claimed a disparity in the reporting DON 
official’s submitted and the one done by GAO officials. The report claimed the Navy had 
not disclosed the range of performance measures and customer satisfaction issues. 
Though Navy officials refuted the claim stating the reports done were adequate as-is, 
GAO officials disagree. Without a meaningful feedback loop and Accurately disclosing 
program and contractor performance, and customer satisfaction to the relevant leadership 
then the issues and deficiencies will continue to linger. 
c. Opportunities 
In the 25-point implementation plan to reform federal information 
technology management, (2010), Kundra urges the federal government to leverage a 
well-developed program management talent strategy that will be the common 
denominator of high-performing IT organizations. DoD has made great strides already 
with its ETA to establish a Global NetOps Command and Control Workforce. The 
activity seeks to develop enterprise-wide position descriptions and occupational standards 
for standardized training, advancement criteria, and performance objectives in 
accordance with DoDD 8570.01-M the premier document for guidance on DoD 
Information Assurance Training, Certification, and Workforce Management.  
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DoD 8570.1-M (2007) identifies and categorizes positions and 
certification of personnel conducting IA functions within the DoD workforce supporting 
the DoD GIG in accordance with overarching DoD directives.
27
 The requirement for 
adequate workforce began as a phased approach in 2005 and after its fourth year it 
mandates that all IT initiatives must be in 100% compliance with 8570.1M, further 
specifying that the Department of Defense requires approximately 110,000 identified 
Information Assurance professionals to be certified. Kundra (2010) contends that the 
management of federal government infrastructure must begin with the training and 
certification of personnel, but must be followed by provisions for lucrative career paths to 
attract and retain the very best performers in the IT industry.  
In addition of adding competent personnel to the federal work forces, there 
must be open collaboration of multi-disciplinary teams with relevant skill sets before 
beginning major IT programs. GAO report (2011b) highlighted successful IT 
implementations based on their respective cost, schedule, scope, and performance goals. 
The common success factors were as follows:  
 Program officials were actively engaged with stakeholders.  
 Program staff had the necessary knowledge and skills.  
 Senior department and agency executives supported the programs. 
 End users and stakeholders were involved in the development of 
requirements. 
 End users participated in testing of system functionality prior to 
formal end user acceptance. 
 Government and contractor staffs were stable and consistent.  
 Program staff prioritized requirements. 
 Program officials maintained regular communication with the 
prime contractor. 
 Programs received sufficient funding. 
The report echoes the importance for a competent cadre of program 
managers; a group of consummate professionals that are just as knowledgeable as the 
                                                 
27 DoD Directive 8000.1, “Management of DoD Information Resources and Information 
Technology,” February 27, 2002 and DoD Directive 8500.1, “Information Assurance,” October 24, 2002. 
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contractors. This team would be very beneficial because the customer and contractor 
would understand exactly what the requirement and proposal really means and avoid 
potential waste of resources.  
In implementing IT, the government should process tasks required to 
satisfy each milestone decision by leveraging nine best practices for developing and 
maintaining a reliable schedule. In the GAO report (2011) Better Informed Decision 
Making Needed on Navy’s Next Generation Enterprise Network Acquisition, the nine best 
practices recommended are as follows: 
 Capturing all activities 
 Sequencing all activities 
 Assigning resources to all activities 
 Establishing the duration of all activities 
 Integrating schedule activities horizontally and vertically 
 Establishing the critical path for all activities 
 Identifying reasonable “float” between activities 
 Conducting a schedule risk analysis 
 Updating the schedule using logic and durations 
These nine best practices ensure that a critical path is established and the chain of 
dependent activities is identified. Identifying the critical path is essential in complex 
projects because of the high level of interdependencies, which means that if any 
predecessor activity slips, it can affect successor activities, and consequently derails the 
whole project. 
d. Threats 
Management of IT infrastructure has to be done with diligence and 
requires a high level of agility and competence from relevant managers. The common 
threat to management of federal government IT is the lack of a thorough assessment 
before the implementation process. Past GAO study revealed that DON officials issued 
its request for proposals without a formal analysis of program alternatives to determine 
an appropriate acquisition strategy for NCMI, a management plan for NMCI, the funding 
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source, and its expected effect on the existing information technology environment 
(Defense Acquisitions Observations, 2000). More recently, with the transition and 
implementation of NGEN, DON officials have failed to perform a thorough analysis to 
help identify the most promising acquisition approach by comparing alternative 
solutions’ costs and operational effectiveness (GAO, 2012a). 
In complex implementations such as the NGEN undertaking, there is no 
substitute for a healthy assessment of the current state of the organization because it 
defines what needs changing within the organization and what needs to remain status quo 
ante (Beckhard and Harris, 1987). A diligent AoA would have encompassed traditional 
analysis to determine a system solution based on data of a comparable system such as 
NMCI. The available data for NMCI were either proprietary (owned by Deloitte 
Consulting) or available at an aggregate level, so the PM and IPT had to rely on subject-
matter experts and other sources to estimate numbers for the analysis. 
To be effective, the analysis of alternatives typically includes discussions 
of interoperability and commonality of system elements within DoD and its agency 
programs. This raises the question of how the DON can assure decision makers of 
success with the notion of segmentation without an effective analysis. The fact is that 
DON cannot guarantee success based on its track record of implementing NMCI. The 
lack of an analysis led to cost and schedule overruns, and today the NMCI costs about 
$1.2 billion a year to run, with an additional $1.5 billion to run existing legacy networks 
(Taylor, 2008). NMCI was supposed to consolidate or eliminate disparate networks, but 
instead it was loosely coupled with legacy systems using middleware,28 which still poses 
management problems. With the notion of segmentation, the risks are seemingly greater, 
especially since the relationships among segments providers and an agreement on 
the limits of each provider's functions has not been made (GAO, 2012a). Figure 10 is a 
depiction of the expected number of relationships that must be managed between the 
segments for NGEN to be successful. 
                                                 
28Middleware is a mechanism to move information and share business logic transparently 
between existing applications. It should integrate differing technologies to provide interoperability. 
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As the number of relationships increase it becomes more difficult to 
manage intricate aspects of a project and with the number of interdependencies in large 
technology projects the risk increase exponentially. In the Wall Street Journal article 
(2007) Lunsford details Boeings experiences with many contractual relationships as it 
sought to acquire its state of the art Dreamliner by outsourcing. The Boeing outsourcing 
concept consisted of a team of parts suppliers in charge of designing and building major 
sections of the craft, which it planned to snap together at its Seattle-area factory. The 
Dreamliner was a novel idea in aircraft manufacturing and required specific expertise to 
design and build the different segment. Boeing handpicked the suppliers but the 
supplier’s in-turn subcontracted key tasks to even-smaller companies. Though 
subcontracting is a common process in large and complex projects, for Boeing it meant 
the first product from the novel idea was a Dreamliner with missing parts. The secondary 
effects of outsourcing are the delays in production of aircraft, all of which have financial 
commitments in place.  
  
Figure 10.  Contractual Relationships in Current NGEN Approach 
(From GAO, 2012a) 
Similar to the management risk with segmentation is the management of 
different domains within NGEN. The threat with the division of domains is the potential 
to raise management concerns, especially during the formation or operation of joint 
commands where the possibility of the domain crossover can occur. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate how the DON and the federal 
government have and continue to manage IT and the effect of implementing it. Through 
the use of SWOT analysis the chapter contextualizes the essence of the organizational 
culture, its merits and disadvantages, opportunities to exploit and the risks if things 
remain as is. Leaders in the DoD, DON, and federal government are beginning to 
understand and accept cyberspace as a military domain. The current warfare environment 
commands a resilient and agile force that fuses the very best concepts, processes, 
organizations, and technology. To get to this force the U.S. must start by building the 
right system, on time every time. Networks serve as a conduit that connects people and 
their concepts, multiplying capabilities and ensuring that the U.S.’s military advantage is 
fully exploited. 
D. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH TOPICS  
This thesis has focused on the common issues that plague implementation of large 
IT in the DoD and the DON. It would be remiss to neglect notable mentions of the other 
issues that are worthy of further investigation and study. These topics are described in the 
subsections below.  
1. Potential flaws of a Common Network  
With the implementation NMCI, the DON merged over 1,000 legacy networks 
into a centralized and more secure network that would serve as a conduit for about 
400,000 workstations and over 700,000 users across 2,500 Navy and Marine Corps 
locations around the world. NGEN, like NMCI, will provide data storage, e-mail, 
transport of voice and data, and video teleconferencing through a standardized set of 
hardware and software across the enterprise. This centralized network offers many 
advantages over isolated networks based mainly on the idea of commonality across the 
enterprise. Leveraging economies of scale, component reuse, sharing of common 
resources, and reduced development scope are a few of the benefits (Boas, 2008). The 
utility of commonality across the enterprise for NGEN can be immediately realized with 
the ability to identify and track performance metrics that can aid with decision-making 
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such as in earned value management. The issue of concern is that with so many users that 
span a variety of communities of interest with varying requirements of the network, 
NGEN might not be flexible enough to accommodate all the requirements of the end 
users. A thesis in this area could explore the capabilities and limitations of NGEN, the 
level of “usability,” and its performance in the different environments that its users will 
be subjected to. 
2. Security  
NMCI, according to GAO reports, was very secure, and with NGEN the target is 
a system with improved security through “continuous security assessments, a centralized 
distribution of vulnerability information, configuration control of critical servers, and an 
improved response to new vulnerabilities/threats” (GAO, 2006). NMCI had the capability 
to defeat over 1,200 unclassified intrusion attempts, block about nine million spam 
attacks and disinfect tens of thousands of viruses per month (DoD, 2009). With the 
acquisition approach for NGEN based on segmentation of services and potential savings, 
DON has to be acutely aware of the increased risk of segmentation in regard to network 
security. A thesis in this area could explore an effective medium of ensuring 
accountability among multiple contractors. One area of concern with accountability is 
that of IA
29
 as information goes across the seams of the segmented network. 
3.  Cost 
(1) LPTA  
The risks and challenges of the low-cost technically acceptable 
process have been discussed in earlier sections. LPTA raises doubts about the 
government getting the best value, and with the imminence of more fiscal constraints in 
the near future; the federal government can no longer guarantee that the military is 
getting the best equipment available. Dependence on the LPTA is dangerous for the DoD, 
DON and federal agencies because, though it appears favorable as a cost saving initiative 
                                                 
29 The process of protecting and defending against all forms of interference of information and 
information systems by ensuring confidentiality, integrity, authentication, availability, and non-repudiation. 
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because of budget constraints, underbidding from contracts only guarantees a low price 
but does not guarantee against risk of failure. With current spending for NGEN at $1.6 
billion, DON is spending over 21% of its annual budget on the implementation and 
associated transition activity. This expenditure raises questions of how DON can sustain 
the costs in the future. A thesis in this area could evaluate the impact of funding on the IT 
infrastructure in DoD.  
(2) Navy IT Knowledge and Skills  
As the battle space continually morphs to a more asymmetric front 
without boundaries and into global domains such as cyberspace, the government has no 
choice but to leverage all its parts to be successful in its mission of defending the 
homeland. With NGEN, the security is provided by 10th Fleet
30
 and with ETA geared to 
strengthen the force, DON appears compliant with 8570.1M. A thesis in this area could 
explore how DON is and will handle limited financial resources in regard to its workforce 
reconstitution efforts for the implementation and management of NGEN. 
E. THESIS CONCLUSION 
The issues that plagued the implementation of NMCI and hinder the 
implementation of NGEN are not easy to address in this thesis because of the sheer level 
of complexity. The thesis identified some of the factors that influence the direction in 
which large projects like NMCI and NGEN can go, and how to militate the negative 
influences while leveraging the positive. Understanding these factors and the degree of 
influence can make the difference between failure and success of the project.  
The takeaway from the thesis is the importance of doing the right thing, the right 
way, the first time. In both implementations, DON officials did a desultory initial 
assessment of the current state before implementation, and in both cases the 
consequences were devastating and costly. The thesis does not suggest prior analysis as a 
panacea for the disconcerted environment associated with IT implementation, but that a 
                                                 
30 U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 10th Fleet is a functional formation of the United States 
Navy responsible for the Navy’s cyber warfare.  
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prior analysis would provide (1) information to determine if there was a real need for 
change, (2) a clear vision of what in the organization needs changing and what needs to 
remain the same, and (3) a definition the future state of the organization. The more 
thorough this assessment, the better the road map and the revelation of the amount of 
work required getting to the future state.  
Finally, individuals cannot execute complex change in a large diverse 
organization and succeed; all stakeholders have to be a part of the solution or the project 
will fail. Collaboration has to be enforced at all levels of the project to ensure all relevant 
stakeholders buy-in the solution because people are motivated to coalesce and achieve a 
desired vision when there is a sense of ownership.  
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B. NAVADMIN 337/08 – NEXT GENERATION ENTERPRISE NETWORK 
(NGEN) SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE (SPO) ESTABLISHMENT 
RTTUZYUW RUEWMCS0000 3311710-UUUU—RUCRNAD ZNR UUUUU 
R 261710Z NOV 08 
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//DNS// 
TO NAVADMIN 
ASSTSECNAV FM WASHINGTON DC//FMB//CMC WASHINGTON DC//C4// 
PEO EIS WASHINGTON DC//PEO C4I SAN DIEGO CA 
COMMARCORSYSCOM QUANTICO VA 
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//NII//JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J6// 
JTF-GNO WASHINGTON DC//HQ USPACOM J6COMMARFORCOM G6// 
COMMARFORPAC G6//COMMARFOREUR G6//COMUSMARCENT G6// 
COMMARFORK G6//DISA WASHINGTON DC//MCOTEA QUANTICO VA 




MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/DNS/NOV//  
SUBJ/NEXT GENERATION ENTERPRISE NETWORK (NGEN) SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE  
(SPO) ESTABLISHMENT//  
REF/A/DOC/SECNAV/20081015/NOTAL// REF/B/DOC/CNO/20081017/NOTAL//  
NARR/REF A IS SECNAV, CMC, AND CNO APPROVED NGEN SPO CHARTER. REF B IS  
CNO INTERIM APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTOR NGEN SPO.// POC/MATTHEW  
GHEN/LCDR/CNO N6N/LOC: WASH DC/TEL: 703-604-8388 
/EMAIL: MATTHEW.GHEN@NAVY.MIL// 
POC/GREG MOORE/LTCOL/HQMC C4/LOC: WASH DC/TEL: 703-693-3476 
/EMAIL: GREGORY.J.MOORE@USMC.MIL// 
RMKS/1. THIS IS A NAVY AND MARINE CORPS COORDINATED MESSAGE TO ANNOUNCE THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NGEN SPO. 
2. THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND THE  
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS HAVE COLLABORATED TO CREATE THE NGEN SPO,  
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF AN ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS(ACNO) REPORTING  
TO NAVY AND MARINE CORPS SERVICE CHIEFS. PER REF A, THE DIRECTOR NGEN SPO WILL  
BE A FLAG OFFICER WITH A USMC O6 DEPUTY. PER REF B, RDML DAVID SIMPSON HAS BEEN  
DESIGNATED AS INTERIM DIRECTOR, NGEN SPO; RADM JOHN GOODWIN WILL REPORT AS  
DIRECTOR IN MARCH 2009. COLONEL  DAVID HAGOPIAN IS THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR. 
3. REF A DESCRIBES THE MISSION, AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND  
ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS THE NGEN SPO WILL HAVE WITHIN DON FOR  
GUIDING DON ELEMENTS AND SERVICES TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. THE NGEN  
SPO SHALL SYNCHRONIZE THE NGEN IMPLEMENTATION WITH PRE- EXISTING  
NETWORK OPERATIONS TO ENSURE CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE  
TRANSITION. THE NGEN SPO SHALL ENSURE THAT, UNTIL SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION  
TO THE NGEN ENVIRONMENT, APPROPRIATE RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES ARE  
EMPLOYED TO ENSURE OPERATIONAL VIABILITY OF AFFECTED SERVICE NETWORKS.  
IN ADDITION, THE NGEN SPO WILL WORK WITH THE RESOURCE SPONSORS TO  
RECONCILE AND PRIORITIZE COMPETING REQUIREMENTS WITHIN ESTABLISHED DON  
FISCAL CONSTRAINTS. THE NGEN SPO WILL ESTABLISH PROGRAM PRIORITIES, DEVELOP  
PROGRAM INPUTS, EXECUTE THE NGEN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT BUDGET AND  
SYNCHRONIZE ACQUISITION, OPERATIONS, SECURITY, AND TRANSITION FUNCTIONS  
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SERVICES TO ENSURE PROGRAM WHOLENESS. THE  
DURATION OF THE NGEN SPO STRUCTURE DEPENDS ON THE NEEDS OF THE SERVICES;  
IT IS INTENDED THAT THE NGEN SPO SHALL EXIST THROUGH TRANSITION AT  
WHICH POINT THE SERVICES MAY REEVALUATE THEIR PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT  
OF THE NGEN SPO. 
4. TO EXECUTE THE MISSION ASSIGNED IN REF A, THE NGEN SPO CONSISTS OF  
THREE DIVISIONS: 
A. NGEN SPO ACQUISITION DIVISION (PM NGEN, PM NMCI, PM ONENET) B. NGEN  SPO  
OPERATIONS DIVISION C. NGEN SPO PROGRAMMING, PLANNING, AND POLICY DIVISION  
5. ACTION. REF A REQUIRES DIRECTOR, NGEN SPO TO CREATE AN IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE  
WITHIN 45 DAYS OF SPO STANDUP. NGEN SPO WILL STAFF THE INITIAL VERSION OF THE  
IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE FOR REVIEW NO LATER THAN 1 DECEMBER. I ENCOURAGE  
YOUR TEAM TO ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THIS REVIEW PROCESS TO ADEQUATELY CAPTURE  
ALL NGEN EQUITIES. 
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C. NAVADMIN 270/10 – NEXT GENERATION ENTERPRISE NETWORK 
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